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Regulating the Market for Snitches
IAN WEINSTEINt
INTRODUCTION
These are boom times for the sellers and buyers of
cooperation1 in the federal criminal justice system. While
prosecutors have always welcomed the assistance of
snitches, tougher federal sentencing laws have led to a
significant increase in cooperation as more defendants try
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., 1981,
Reed College; J.D., 1986, New York University School of Law; LL.M., 1990,
Georgetown University Law Center. I want to thank the following individuals
for their assistance: Greg Drevenstedt, M.A., a doctoral candidate in demo-
graphy and sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, for his work on the
statistical analysis in this paper; Cheryl Bader, James Cohen, Deborah Denno,
Ted Neustadt and Daniel Richman for their comments; and Melissa LaRocca,
my research assistant. Fordham University provided financial support for this
project.
Although I have tried to write dispassionately about cooperation here, I
have also been a partisan in cooperation cases, representing more than fifty
cooperators and cross examining several as an associate attorney Federal
Defender Services Unit of the Legal Aid Society of New York from 1988 through
1991, and as a member of the Criminal Justice Act Panel for the Southern
District of New York.
1. "Cooperation" is a term of art for the process by which a federal criminal
defendant gains the possibility of sentence mitigation by providing assistance in
the prosecution or investigation of others. "Snitching," "substantial assistance"
and "ratting" are all synonymous with cooperation, if not quite interchangeable.
The Oxford English Dictionary notes that "snitch" is slang and of obscure
origin. Its first definition is "A fillip ton the nose)," the second is "'e Nose" and
the third is "An informer; one who turns King's or Queen's evidence." The first
citation for the use of "snitch" as informer is to a 1785 dictionary entry, followed
by an 1800 citation from Byron and many others. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
858 (2d ed. 1989); see also Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST.
L.J. 69, 72 n.13 (1995) (associating "snitch" with the nose and so with in-
forming).
2. I am not aware of any data on cooperation rates before the Sentencing
Commission began collecting and analyzing data pursuant to its statutory
directive, 28 U.S.C. § 995(12)-(16) (1994 & Supp. 1997), but the relatively
sparing use of cooperation in the first years of the Guidelines is consistent with
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to provide "substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person,"3 to have some chance of
receiving a significant sentence reduction. In 1996 one of
every five defendants sentenced in the federal courts won
mitigation by providing substantial assistance.' Many more
defendants tried but failed to close the deal.
The overheated cooperation market is creating serious
problems in the federal criminal justice system. Cooper-
ation is unevenly distributed and subject to wide variations
in local practices and policies. While one defendant may
receive a very significant sentence reduction for a given
kind of assistance to the government, another may receive
no reward for the same efforts. The system is rife with
individual and district-to-district disparities, a problematic
situation in a sentencing regime that values uniform
sentencing above all else.' The excessive use of cooperation
also damages the adversary system by putting too many
defendants on the government's team and making the
defense lawyer little more than a passive observer of his or
her client's case.6 Finally, widespread cooperation is ethi-
the sense of experienced practitioners that cooperation was not as widespread
before the Guidelines as it is now. In 1989, the first year data was available,
only 3.5% of the cases involved substantial assistance departures. In 1990 the
number climbed to 7.5%, and continued to move up to 11.9% in 1991, 15.1% in
1992 and 16.9% in 1993. In 1994 the figure reached 19.5% and has remained at
about that level, 19.7% in 1995 and 19.2% in 1996. See UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMI'N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 39
fig.G (1996) [hereinafter 1996 FED. SENT. SRCBK.]. This information is also
available at the United States Sentencing Commission Homepage (Jan. 30,
1999) <http://www.ussc.gov> (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review).
A federal judge and former federal prosecutor has pointed to these same
statistics to support the view that cooperation has increased since the
introduction of the Sentencing Guidelines. See John Gleeson, Supervising
Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of the Supervisory Power of Federal
Judges, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 423, 424 n.9 (1997).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994). See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5K1.1 (1997) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] (stating the policy regarding criminals
who provide substantial assistance to authorities).
4. The Sentencing Commission has reported sentencing statistics on a fiscal
year basis, October I to September 30, since 1990. See 1996 FED. SENT. SRCBK.,
supra note 2, at 39 fig.G n.1. Between October 1, 1995, and September 30, 1996,
19.2%, or 7845 of the total 40,879 criminal sentences imposed under the
Sentencing Guidelines involved sentence mitigation (downward departures from
the otherwise applicable range established by the Sentencing Guidelines) to
reward substantial assistance. See id. at tbl.26.
5. For a discussion of sentencing disparities, see infra pp. 601-17.
6. For the impact of excessive cooperation on the adversary system, see infra
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cally problematic. Because disloyalty is at the heart of
cooperation, snitching engenders almost universal moral
ambivalence and we should question whether the govern-
ment should encourage so much of it.' The current rate of
cooperation is particularly troubling because a significant
portion of snitching brings relatively few concomitant law
enforcement benefits.' The current rate of cooperation is
unjustifiable.
Unfortunately, cooperation will remain excessive until
the incentives for its use are reduced. Those who make the
day-to-day decisions to buy and sell cooperation gain many
benefits from the practice and are largely unaffected by the
systemic problems of inequity, damage to the adversary
system and the moral ambivalence surrounding snitching.
The current market for snitches cannot optimize the use of
cooperation because these decision-makers internalize the
benefits and externalize (and so largely ignore) the costs.
The problem of externalized costs in the criminal justice
system is not unique to cooperation.9 It is part of the story
of the ascendancy of the plea bargain and its centrality in
the American criminal justice system. Docket congestion
and other systemic pressures on prosecutors, defendants
and defense lawyers have long meant that most criminal
cases in America are resolved by negotiated plea agree-
ments, not by trial, despite persistent questions about the
pp. 617-22.
7. For discussion of our strong moral ambivalence about snitching, see infra
pp. 622-25.
8. For discussion of why some cooperation may not have significant law
enforcement value, see infra pp. 613-14.
9. The problem of the externalization of the costs of prosecution are dis-
cussed by Robert L. Misner, along with his proposal for a market incentive
based approach to regulating discretion. See Robert L. Misner, Criminal Law:
Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 766-71
(1996) (urging tying prosecutorial discretion to the availability of prison
resources to internalize costs and provide an incentive to maximize strategic
law enforcement planning). Two classic examples of economic analysis of dis-
cretion in the criminal justice system are Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal
Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STuD. 289, 290 (1983) (discussing
the incentives favoring plea bargaining and arguing that prosecutorial dis-
cretion is an efficient and fair regulator) and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal
Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1988)
(explaining that prosecutorial discretion in charging, bargaining and sentencing
does not lead to the most efficient results because of problems of public
management; even if it were most efficient, fairness concerns would still justify
some controls on discretion).
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practice. ° For example, 90.4% of all federal criminal cases
in 1996 were resolved with pleas of guilty and only 9.6% of
the cases went to trial." Defendants are usually induced to
plead guilty by the promise of sentence mitigation in return
for waiving their right to trial. 2 Prosecutors enter into plea
10. One general argument is that prosecutors find the immediate benefits of
plea bargaining so attractive that they overshadow relatively weak concerns
about its systemic costs. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as
Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992) (providing an example of one of the most
insightful and persistent criticisms of plea bargaining, arguing for the elim-
ination of plea bargaining). For discussions of pre-Guidelines plea bargaining,
see generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69
CAL. L. REV. 652 (1981) (criticizing plea bargaining as irrational, unfair and
reaching results unrelated to the proper objectives of criminal prosecution) and
PAMELA J. UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL
COURT (1978) (defending plea bargaining).
11. A total of 60,255 defendants were "disposed of' in the federal courts in
1996. Dismissals accounted for 7,083 of those defendants. Of the remaining
53,172 defendants, 4976 (9.4% of the defendants whose cases were not
dismissed) went to trial. Of those 4976 defendants who went to trial, 902 (18%
of all defendants who went to trial) were acquitted and 4074 (82% of all
defendants who went to trial) were convicted. The remaining 48,196 (90.6% of
the defendants whose cases were not dismissed) entered pleas of guilty or nolo
contendre. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK OF CRMIINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 448 tbl.5.27 (1996) [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE SRCBK.]. The
rate of trials in the state courts appears similar, -vith an average plea rate of
89% reported for felony convictions in state courts in 1994. Id. at 471 tbl.5.52.
12. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971) (taking
the inducement to plead as a given in holding that plea agreements are
enforceable). That inducement, in the form of sentence mitigation, has been
formalized in the Sentencing Guidelines system. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The
Guidelines permit the judge to reduce a defendant's "offense level" by two or
three points, depending on the severity of the offense level and the judge's
evaluation of the degree of the acceptance of responsibility. The maximum of
the range at a given offense level exceeds the minimum by six months or 25%,
whichever is greater. The maximum of the range of each offense level (above
level 12) is the mid-point of the next higher offense level range and the
minimum of the range two levels higher. Thus, a two point reduction makes
what was formerly the minimum sentence now the maximum sentence, while a
three point reduction puts the maximum about 14% lower than the former
minimum. The overall inducement can be as low as no mitigation (the judge can
impose the same sentence as the maximum after plea as could have been
imposed as the minimum after trial, assuming a two point reduction) to an
almost 40% reduction in sentence, comparing the high end of the range at the
unreduced offense level with the low end of the range three offense levels lower.
Defendants may even receive modest relief from statutorily mandated
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses if they agree to plead guilty,
disclose their criminal activities, are first time offenders and meet certain other
requirements. This safety valve provision is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)
(Supp. 1997). See Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the
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agreements for a number of reasons, but chiefly because
they are efficient and virtually risk free.
In one light cooperation agreements may be seen as
simply a subset of plea agreements. Cooperation agree-
ments are a particularly attractive kind of plea agreement
but their relatively greater attractiveness does not, by
itself, justify addressing cooperation separately from other
plea bargains. After all, a decrease in cooperation would not
decrease overall plea bargaining-it would just change the
deals. It is important, however, to view the problem in an-
other light and see the unique problems associated with co-
operation, in addition to those of ordinary plea bargains.
Those difficulties justify reforming the current market for
cooperation and driving some defendants and prosecutors
away from cooperation and back to standard plea agree-
ments. The challenge is finding a way to achieve an optimal
reduction in cooperation, while at the same time maxi-
mizing its law enforcement benefits and minimizing its
inequities and other costs.
The difficulties in finding the right mechanism stem
primarily from cooperation's role as one of the decisions
about allocating law enforcement resources and framing
charges that our system commits to prosecutorial
discretion." Direct regulation of prosecutorial discretion" is
Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1883
(1995) for a discussion of the safety valve provision.
13. The Supreme Court has noted on many occasions that charging
decisions are within the:
"special province" of the Executive. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
832 (1985). The Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain
" 'broad discretion' " to enforce the Nation's criminal laws. Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (quoting United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380, n.l (1982)). They have this latitude
because they are designated by statute as the President's delegates to
help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3; see 28 U.S.C.
§§ 516, 547. As a result, "[tihe presumption of regularity supports"
their prosecutorial decisions and, "in the absence of clear evidence to
the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their
official duties." United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1,
14-15 (1926). In the ordinary case, "so long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in
his discretion." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (holding that discovery on
1999] 567
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inherently problematic. After all, one reason we rely upon
the prosecutor's discretion is because each decision requires
expert balancing of situation specific facts and circumstan-
ces. Cooperation, however, is a uniquely powerful and prob-
lematic prosecutorial weapon whose current overuse de-
mands that we find a way to control this exercise of dis-
cretion.
This Article argues for an unusual solution to meet this
particular problem-the imposition of a numerical limit on
the number of defendants who may be rewarded with sen-
tence mitigation in order to impose a cost on prosecutors to
encourage them to use fewer cooperators. Once prosecutors
begin to pay a price for snitches they will be more careful
about what they get in return, maximizing the law enforce-
ment value of those they do use. While it is true that we do
not usually restrict prosecutors' use of particular invest-
igative tools, more traditional approaches to this problem,
such as direct regulation of prosecutorial discretion15 or re-
ducing defendants' incentives to cooperate16 will either
prove ineffective or lead to reduced but suboptimal use of
cooperators. Raising the cost of cooperation to the prosecu-
tors by limiting the number of snitches they may reward is
the only way to decrease snitching overall while maximiz-
ing its law enforcement benefits. 1
a selective prosecution claim is only required after a threshold showing that
others of a different race who were otherwise similarly situated were not
prosecuted).
14. The sentencing reforms of the 1980s have increased the relative
importance of prosecutorial discretion. Although those changes have reduced
discretion generally, they have much more significantly reduced judicial senten-
cing discretion, leaving prosecutors with a greater degree of control over
sentencing than they enjoyed under the old law. See Cynthia KY. Lee, From
Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's Expanding Power
Over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 199 (1997);
Misner, supra note 9, at 719. See generally Cynthia Kwei Young Lee,
Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105 (1994) (arguing that a prosecutor's discretion
over sentencing issues is not related to discretion regarding bargaining or
charging). Others have argued that power has shifted to Congress. See James B.
Burns et al., We Make the Better Target (But the Guidelines Shifted Power from
the Judiciary to Congress, Not from the Judiciary to the Prosecution), 91 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1317 (1997).
15. For problems with direct regulation of prosecutorial discretion, see infra
pp. 626-29.
16. For a discussion of lowering defendants' incentives, see infra pp. 629-31.
17. For an evaluation of measures to limit the demand for cooperators, see
568 [Vol. 47
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This Article begins with an analysis of supply and
demand in the cooperation market and explains why indi-
vidual actors on both sides see many benefits and few costs
in the practice. The next section discusses the systemic ex-
ternalized costs in sentencing inequity, damage to the
adversarial system and government encouragement of
morally questionable behavior. The third section evaluates
the potential solutions in the light of those problems and ar-
ticulates the argument for a limitation on the number of
snitches prosecutors may reward.
I. THE "SEEMINGLY INEXHAUSTIBLE SUPPLY" 18 OF SNITCHES
A. The Legislative Incentives
Rewarding defendants who assist law enforcement has
deep roots in Anglo-American law. In the days before or-
ganized police agencies, accomplice testimony was even
more valuable than it is today and was rewarded with the
extraordinary benefits of immunity from prosecution or ex-
ecutive clemency. 9 With the development of more system-
atic approaches to crime control" came the formal sanction-
ing and expansion of negotiated agreements between prose-
cutors and cooperators. The traditional rewards of clemen-
cy or immunit' have largely been replaced by pleas to less
serious charges and other mechanisms for sentence miti-
infra pp. 630-32.
18. Gleeson, supra note 2, at 424.
19. See Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45
VAND. L. REV. 1, 8-14 (1992) (tracing the history of inducements to snitching);
The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878) (discussing historical and late nine-
teenth century practices and holding that a defendant could not plead
compulsion to testify against an accomplice as a formal bar to prosecution but
could delay trial and apply for executive clemency to which he had equitable
title).
20. For the history of the development of the professional prosecutor in
America, see Misner, supra note 9, at 728-31.
21. This Article does not discuss the use of immunity agreements, requests
for which peaked in 1986 at 2550 and have fallen somewhat steadily to 1493 in
1996. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE SROBK., supra note 11, at 418 tbl.5.1. Although
they are fairly viewed as the "extreme variant" of the cooperation agreements
discussed here, Richman, supra note 1, at 151 n.14, they involve the dynamic of
witness and prosecutor-a very different relationship from that of defendant
and prosecutor, particularly when the prosecutor has power over sentence miti-
gation.
1999] 569
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gation.2
Over the last ten years this trend has accelerated and
crystallized as changes in federal law have formalized spe-
cific and powerful cooperation incentives. These changes be-
gan with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA),23 which
created the Sentencing Commission and directed that body
to draft the Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines)." The
Guidelines replaced a system of judicially determined dis-
cretionary sentencing" with a system of mandatory26 sen-
22. See generally Hughes, supra note 19, at 10-13 (discussing the devel-
opment of modern practices and the importance of the sanctioning of plea
bargaining in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)).
23. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-
3586, and at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994 & Supp. 1996)).
24. The statutory directive to draft the Guidelines is codified at 28 U.S.C. §
994 (1994 & West Supp. 1998). Much has been written about the impact and
wisdom of the Guidelines. See generally THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL
SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE (1994); PHYLLIS SKLOOT BAmBERGER, PRACTICE
UNDER THE FEDERAL GUIDELINES (1993); HARRY I. SUBIN ET AL., THE CRIMINAL
PROCESS: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS, § 10, at 131-61 (1992). Aca-
demic debate has raged about the fairness of the Guidelines system. Compare
Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of the Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CmH. L. REV. 901 (1991) (analyzing the conflicting provisions
and arguing for more individualization), Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in
the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers,
101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992) (analyzing the conflicting provisions and arguing for
greater judicial power to individualize), and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing
the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833 (1992) (calling for more individualization within the
Guidelines system); with Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be
Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679 (defending the Guidelines), and Julie R.
O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense
System, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1342 (1997) (defending the fundamental choice of
modified, as opposed to pure charged offense sentencing, as necessary to impose
sentences meaningfully related to the underlying wrongful conduct).
25. See Ian Weinstein, Judicial Discretion and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming Spring 1999) (manuscript on file with
author and the Buffalo Law Review) (describing old law discretionary sen-
tencing). Criticism of unfettered judicial discretion was central to the demise of
that system. A federal judge was the most influential critic of unfettered
judicial sentencing. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES
(1973).
26. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 223, 268 (1993) (describing the battle between those who successfully ad-
vocated mandatory Guidelines and those who would have let judges retain
greater discretion).
1999] REGULATING SNITCHES 571
tencing ranges for every offender. The SRA marked a sea of
change in federal criminal sentencing but its impact was
slow to be felt. 27
The mid-1980s push to get tough on crime could not
await the development of systemic reform. In 1986 Con-
gress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.28 The Act's
provisions included statutory mandatory minimum pen-
alties for those who trafficked in, imported or possessed
specified amounts of particular narcotics. 9 Although the
27. Sentences are now longer but it took time for this major reform to take
effect. See Bowman, supra note 24, at 732 n.186 (explaining that sentences are
longer under the Guidelines); Stith & Koh, supra note 26 (describing how the
Commission exercised the discretion conferred upon it to increase the severity
of sentences); David Yellen, What Juvenile Court Abolitionists Can Learn from
the Failures of Sentencing Reform, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 577, 585-90 (using the
development of the federal Guidelines to illustrate how sentencing reform
politics inevitably lead to harsher punishments). The Guidelines had to be
drafted, take effect and withstand challenge before they governed federal
sentencing. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines).
28. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-848 (1994 & West Supp. 1998)).
29. The most important mandatory minimum sentence provisions are
codified, at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 860 (1994 & West Supp. 1998) and 18 U.S.C. §
924(c) (1994 & West Supp. 1998). There are mandatory minimum sentences for
offenses other than narcotics sentences but as the Sentencing Commission
noted in 1991, of the 60 mandatory minimum statutes then on the books, the
four relating to particular instances of narcotics trafficking, importation and
possession and weapons offenses committed in the course of another crime
accounted for the vast bulk of the convictions and sentences. UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 (1991) [hereinafter
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES] (indicating that four statutes, setting
mandatory minimum penalties for certain drug trafficking, drug importation,
drug possession and firearms offenses accounted for 94% of all statutory
mandatory minimum sentences; the overall argument of this report stresses the
incompatibility of mandatory minimums with the Guidelines system). See gen-
erally Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States
Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a
Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185 (1993)
(emphasizing the legislature's ultimate responsibility for setting sentences and
suggesting mechanisms for greater oversight of the Commission in place of
mandatory minimums); Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws:
Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 61 (1993) (discussing and evaluating the adoption of statutory mandatory
minimum sentences in both the state and federal systems); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 199
(1993) (arguing that although mandatory minimums meet some of their goals,
those goals can be achieved by other means that avoid the irrefutable ill effects
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Guidelines have impacted every federal criminal sentence
and have thus had greater long-term impact, the man-
datory minimum narcotics sentences in the 1986 law were
an important turning point in federal sentencing. At a time
when judges enjoyed great discretion in criminal sentencing
and had statutory authority to suspend almost all sen-
tences," the reintroduction' of five, ten and twenty year
mandatory minimum sentences3 was a significant change."
of the statutory minimums).
30. At the time the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was passed, this statutory
language gave judges the discretion to impose a sentence of no incarceration in
most cases:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable
by death or life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try
offenses against the United States when satisfied that the ends ofjustice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will
be served thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence
and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems best.
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, Title I, § 212(a) (2), 98 Stat. 1987 (applying to offenses committed prior
to Nov. 1, 1987).
31. The Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 651
(1956), included mandatory minimum sentences of five to thirty years for a
variety of narcotics offenses, which were virtually all repealed by the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1236 (1970). For a discussion of the history of mandatory minimums
from 1790 through 1990, see MANDATORY MINnIM PENALTIES, supra note 29, at
6-12.
32. The five and ten year mandatory sentences of 21 U.S.C. § 841 are keyed
to the weight of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of a
controlled substance. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 457 (1991)
(holding that the statute requires that the weight of the carrier medium be
included in determining the applicability of the statutory mandatory minimum
for trafficking in LSD). The twenty year mandatory sentence applies to
individuals convicted of offenses involving the required quantity of drugs who
have also been previously convicted of a narcotics offense.
33. It was also an unwise change according to many. The Sentencing
Commission and many commentators have argued that statutory mandatory
minimums have no role in a comprehensive sentencing scheme and introduce
anomalous results. See generally Lowenthal, supra note 29 (discussing conflicts
between determinate sentencing schemes and mandatory minimums); MAN-
DATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 29 (noting conflicts between the
Guidelines and mandatory minimums). Others have argued that mandatoryminimums are not cost effective. See generally JONATHON P. CAULIUNS ET AL,,
RAND DRUG POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, MANDATORY DRUG SENTENCES: THROWING
AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYERS' MONEY (1997) (providing an empirical
analysis of costs and benefits of mandatory minimums). Some of the worst
effects of the mandatory minimums have been addressed, albeit rather weakly,
by the safety valve provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (1994 & West Supp. 1997),
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In addition to the statutory mandatory minimum
provisions, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 included two
amendments which received little comment at the time,34
but created the boom market in cooperation. One provision
gave judges authority to sentence below a statutory man-
datory minimum to reflect a defendant's cooperation, upon
motion of the government.35 The other amended the statu-
tory directive of the SRA to include the direction that the
Sentencing Commission "assure that the guidelines reflect
the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence
than would otherwise be imposed ... to take into account a
defendant's substantial assistance . *...,,36 Each provision
provides strong incentives to reach cooperation agreements
by holding out the potential for sentence mitigation.
Statutory mandatory minimums are, as the name sug-
gests, statutory provisions that require judges to impose not
less than the specified sentence upon conviction. Typically
the statutes permit harsher but not lesser sentences. Once
permitting sentences below the mandatory minimums for some first offenders.
See generally Oliss, supra note 12, at 1892 (calling the provision a small first
step).
Mandatory sentencing provisions have proliferated despite those criticisms.
See Ronald Weich, The Battle Against Mandatory Minimums: A Report from the
Front Lines, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 94 (1996) (chief counsel to Senator
Kennedy writing on the difficulties of opposing mandatory minimum sentence
provisions during the 104th Congress, which passed immigration and child
pornography bills including mandatory minimums but did not approve proposed
end of term legislation including higher mandatory minimum sentences for
methamphetamine and new mandatory minimums for Rohyphynol (the "date
rape" drug)).
34. The statutes which fostered widespread cooperation, Pub. L. No. 99-570,
§§ 1007, 1008, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986), were passed as a pair of amendments
buried deep in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. There was no debate in either
chamber and no mention of the change appears in any of the reports or other
legislative history of that act, save a brief comment on the floor by Senator
Dole, 132 CONG. REC. 31,409 (1986); see also United States v. Severich, 676 F.
Supp 1209, 1212 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that the "legislative history appears
silent as to any appropriate and articulated rationale for the substantial assis-
tance feature.").
35. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1007, codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1994 & West Supp 1998).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994 & West Supp. 1998) offers a counter example in
its requirement that a defendant convicted of using or carrying a firearm during
or in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking be sentenced to a five
year term of imprisonment, not more or less, to run consecutive to any other
sentence imposed.
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a defendant has been convicted of an offense carrying a
statutory mandatory minimum sentence, there are only two
ways the judge can mitigate his or her punishment. If the
defendant is a first offender, and meets other conditions, he
or she may be eligible for a modest sentence reduction
through the "safety valve" provision. If the defendant does
not meet those conditions, or seeks the possibility of a
greater sentence reduction, cooperation offers the only
mechanism. The incentive to cooperate created by the pro-
vision permitting sentences below the statutory mandatoryminimum is quite straightforward.
The incentive that flows from the relevant Guideline
provision, United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 5K1.1, Substantial Assistance to Authorities, is also
strong, but a bit more complicated.39 The provision is one
piece of an overall scheme that standardizes sentencing by
imposing a range, ° expressed as a minimum and maximum
number of months, within which the defendant must be
sentenced unless the judge finds a legal basis for going
outside or in Guidelines terminology "departing" from the
range.4?
38. See id. § 3553(f); supra note 12 (discussing the "safety valve" provision).
39. The overall complexity of the Guidelines has been a subject of partic-
ularly interesting and insightful criticism. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline
Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences,
91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441 (1997) (arguing that the complexity and rigidity of the
Guidelines have led the courts to take a high enforcement/low judicial creativity
approach to sentencing); Kate Stith & Jose Cabranes, Judging Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247, 1281 (1997) (criticizing
the Commission's efforts to "micro-manage" sentencing).
40. The guideline range is determined by finding the defendant's place on
the Sentencing Table, a matrix defined by a vertical axis determined by rules
keyed to the severity of the defendant's conduct and a horizontal axis
determined by prior criminal record. Each box in the matrix is assigned a sen-
tencing range, expressed as a minimum and maximum number of months
within which the defendant must be sentenced. See U.S.S.G., supra note 3, at
§ 5A Sentencing tbl.
41. Judges may depart downward from the range, mitigating the sentence,
or they may depart upward, making the sentence harsher. See U.S.S.G., supra
note 3, at § 1A4(b). Departures must be distinguished from adjustments; ad-
justments are factors related to the crime or the criminal which raise or lower
the offense level within the Guidelines scheme, while departures are factors
created by the Commission to take the case outside the Guidelines scheme all
together. Id. at § 3. The Guidelines separate departure factors into three
categories: those that judges are encouraged to use, those that they are dis-
couraged from using and those that they are forbidden from using. See id. at §
1A4(b); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 (1996) (discussing the
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The Guidelines have made sentences both more severe
and predictable." There is now a certain-and for many an
all too minor-sentencing difference between an ordinary
plea agreement and a trial." Consider the actual choice
between a sentence of 120 to 135 months after a plea and a
roles of forbidden, encouraged, discouraged and unmentioned departure factors
and holding that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review of district
decisions to depart). Forbidden factors such as race, sex, national origin, creed,
religion and socio-economic status may never be the basis for a departure. See
U.S.S.G., supra note 3, at § 5H.10. Others are encouraged, such as upward
departures in cases where the defendant's criminal history category does not
adequately reflect the seriousness of his or her past conduct. See id. at § 4A1.3.
Discouraged factors, such as age, education, mental and emotional conditions,
physical condition, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, mili-
tary, civic, charitable or public service and lack of guidance as a youth are not
"ordinarily relevant" to determining the sentence but may be considered if the
situation is not ordinary. See id. at §§ 5H1.1-1.6, 1.11-12. This set of factors has
spawned much litigation, with disparate results. Compare United States v.
Galante, 111 F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming departure based on
discouraged factor of family circumstances), with United States v. Wilson, 114
F.3d 429 (4th Cir. 1997) (reversing departure based on family circumstances).
See generally Weinstein, supra note 25 (manuscript at 49-79) (comparing
differing circuit court approaches to departures after Koon, 518 U.S. at 81).
Departures based upon factors not mentioned in the Guidelines must be
considered on a case-by-case basis and cannot be categorically excluded. See
Koon, 518 U.S. at 108.
42. Under the Guidelines, defense lawyers are able to make much more
accurate sentence predictions much earlier in the case than they could in the
era of discretionary sentencing. This has a significant impact on defendants'
decision making. Under the old system, defendants could make their decisions
with the hope of a lenient sentence and a lawyer could not tell them such a
sentence was legally impossible. No matter how bad the odds, in a discretionary
regime there is always a chance. That is no longer the case. Defendants facing
the Guidelines or a statutory mandatory minimum cannot even gamble on
leniency. The role of greater predictability in shaping the decision making of
defendants, who must make very important decisions under very difficult
circumstances, is probably quite significant, although its effects may be hard to
separate out from the impact of longer sentences.
43. Despite predictions that the Guidelines would result in more trials, that
does not seem to be the case. Although trial rates increased in the first three
years, they have since retreated. Two data sets show the same trend. The
Commission collects data for the mode of conviction, a number that does not
account for acquittals. By that measure, the rate of trial was 11.9% in 1989,
12.3% in 1990, 14.6% in 1991, 13.0% in 1992, 11.5% in 1993, 9.5% in 1994, 8.1%
in 1995 and 8.3% in 1996. 1996 FED. SENT. SRCBK., supra note 2, at 15 fig. C.
Using the numbers from Defendants Disposed of in U.S. District Courts, in
BUREAU OF JUSTICE SRCBK., supra note 11, at 448 tbl.5.27, the rate of trial
among all defendants whose cases were not dismissed was: 16% in 1989, 16% in
1990, 15% in 1991, 14% in 1992, 12% in 1993, 11% in 1994, 10% in 1995 and 9%
in 1996.
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sentence of 151 to 188 months following conviction after
trial.' Assuming that this defendant faces a high proba-
bility of conviction, his or her best case scenario is the
daunting prospect of spending about 102 months in prison,
after credit for good behavior. 'Although the best case after
trial will involve an additional two years in prison,46 the
marginal benefit is dwarfed by what many defendants per-
ceive to be a very long prison sentence in either case. Thus,
virtually all defendants are keenly interested in downward
departures, the primary formal mechanism of sentence
mitigation under the Guidelines.47
44. See U.S.S.G., supra note 3, at § 5A Sentencing tbl. These ranges are for
a hypothetical defendant facing narcotics trafficking charges involving one
kilogram of heroin or five kilograms of cocaine or fifty grams of cocaine base
who had two prior non-drug convictions. Assuming no adjustments, that
defendant would be at offense level 32, criminal history category III, upon
conviction after trial for a sentencing range of 151-88 months. Assuming that he
or she received the three point downward adjustment for acceptance of re-
sponsibility, § 3E1.1(b), the sentence would be at level 29, criminal history
category III, and ten year mandatory minimum would determine the bottom of
the sentencing range, which would be 120-35 months.
45. The reduction from the ten year mandatory minimum reflects sentence
credit for good behavior. Federal prisoners serving sentences longer than one
year, but less than life (including those serving statutory mandatory minimum
sentences) can receive 54 days of "good time" credit on any sentence longer than
one year. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1994 & West Supp. 1998).
46. This figure is calculated by subtracting 15% good time credit from 151
months yielding roughly 129 months or ten years and nine months.
47. Defendants also have a strong incentive to litigate the many detailed
calculations underlying the determination of the sentencing range including
sentence mitigation and proper sentence calculation, depending on the
underlying facts related to each case. See discussion infra nn.180 & 181
(outlining Guidelines calculations issues that are often used to manipulate
sentences). For a broad historical discussion of mitigation, see generally Roscoe
Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual
Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925 (1960) (tracing the history of the devel-
opment of the equitable powers of dispensation and mitigation and arguing for
greater individualization of legal results). The other significant source of
mitigation is prosecutorial charging decisions. See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel &
Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging
and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV. 501 (1989) (describing prosecutorial charging practices in three
districts); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and its Dynamics in
the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284 (1997) (discussing the
mechanisms prosecutors use to manipulate the Guidelines); Stephen J.
Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 231 (1989)
(comparing prosecutorial practices before and after the Mistretta decision).
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Among the varied grounds for downward departures,
substantial assistance stands out in two important ways.
First, the government is the sole gatekeeper for cooperation
departures. Although judges exercise complete control over
whether to grant all other departures,48 substantial assis-
tance requires a motion from the government.49 Second,
substantial assistance is also far and away the most
common ground for departure, with twice as many cases
involving cooperation as all the other factors put together."
As a practical matter, cooperation is the most likely, and
often the only realistic chance, a defendant has to get a
sentence below the Guideline range.51
For those facing a statutory mandatory minimum sen-
tence the situation looks, and is, even bleaker. Except for
the relatively modest benefit available to some first time
offenders through the "safety valve" provision, a govern-
ment motion seeking mitigation to reward cooperation is
the only path to a lower sentence. In either case,
substantial assistance opens the possibility of a dramatic
48. Weinstein, supra note 25 (manuscript at 30-32) (explaining judicial
discretion in non-substantial assistance departures).
49. The statutory and Guidelines requirements for a government motion in
this instance as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 combine
to create a key element in the shift in sentencing discretion from judges to
prosecutors. See Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 14, at 107-08; Lee, From Gatekeeper
to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's Expanding Power Over
Substantial Assistance Departures, supra note 14, at 234-38; Misner, supra note
9, at 757-58 n.295. There are very limited avenues for judges to recognize
cooperation in the absence of a motion. See Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion,
Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 14,
at 144 n.175 (discussing cases in which judges have departed without govern-
ment motion to recognize extraordinary acceptance of responsibility or to re-
ward a defendant for encouraging another to plead and so assisting the court).
50. There were 40,879 sentences imposed under the Guidelines in 1996. See
1996 FED. SENT. SRCBK., supra note 2, at 41 tbl.26. A total of 28,445 (69.6%) of
those were within the Guidelines range. Id. Of those sentences, 43.8% were
within the first quarter of the range, 9.6% were in the second quarter, 3.3%
were in the third quarter and 9.1% were in the fourth quarter. See 1996 FED.
SENT. SRCBK., supra note 2, at 44 tbl.27. A total of 7845 sentences (19.2% of the
total) involved departures based on substantial assistance. Other downward
departures were involved in 4201 (10.3% of the total number) and 388 cases
(0.9%) involved upward departures. 1996 FED. SENT. SRCBK., supra note 2, at 41
tbl.26.
51. The 10% of sentenced defendants who receive the benefit of other
downward departures typically present compelling facts which are evident from
the start of the decision process, or are sentenced by a lenient judge.
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sentence reduction, all the way down to the gold standard-
a sentence of no prison time at all.52
Under the current sentencing regime, cooperation is the
only option that significantly alters the most important set
of considerations for most defendants-those that relate to
the ultimate sentence to be imposed. For many defendants,
cooperation offers the only opportunity for significant sen-
tence mitigation or escaping prison all together,53 regardless
of the seriousness of the offense. The sentencing reforms of
the late 1980s redefined the reality and the perception of
the federal criminal defendant's spectrum of choices.
52. Once a judge finds a ground for departing downward from the
guidelines, the magnitude of the departure is in his or her discretion. See, e.g.,
United States v. Robinson, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3641, at *3-4 (6th Cir. Feb.
24, 1997) (explaining that the magnitude of departure is in judge's discretion).
Judges may impose non-incarceratory seritences in most cases, despite the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a) (1), which forbids probation to anyone
convicted of a crime carrying a statutory maximum of 25 years or more. See
United States v. Elliott, 971 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a sentence
of no jail is not a probationary sentence and is permitted despite 18 U.S.C. §
3561(a) (1)). But see United States v. Greene, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 19056, at
*1 (4th Cir. June 18, 1996) (finding no difference between a sentence of
probation and no imprisonment but noting that cooperators, but not other
relevant departure recipients, may receive non-incarceratory sentences). For
discussion of the problems engendered by the lack of consistency in practices
governing the magnitude of departures see Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar
Screens: Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge's
Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1027, 1045-46 (1997) (commenting on
warranted versus unwarranted disparity and the failure to control the mag-
nitude of departures from the perspective a United States District Court Judge
for the District of Massachusetts).
53. The other path to serving no prison time, immunity from prosecution, is
very rarely taken. One imprecise measure is the 1493 grants of immunity by
federal prosecutors in 1996, BUREAU OF JUSTICE SRCBK., supra note 11, at 448
tbl.5.27, a number which includes grants to witnesses whose prosecution was
not contemplated but does not include agreements to forego prosecution that do
not include immunity. Potential defendants are only occasionally immunized
from all prosecutions to induce them to assist the government. The prosecution
of several Texaco executives on charges stemming from their alleged efforts to
destroy evidence subpoenaed in a civil case illustrates the difficult judgments
prosecutors must make. A Texaco official tape recorded incriminating con-
versations and then offered the tapes to the government in return for immunity
from prosecution. The government refused immunity and indicted him instead.
He and his co-defendant were acquitted and the government failed to convict
anyone. See United States v. Lundwall, 97 Cr. 211 (BDP) (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Ex-
Texaco Treasurer Indicted in Race Discrimination Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
1997, at A36; Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco Witness is Said to be Talking to U.S.,
N.Y. TndEs, Jan. 8, 1997, at D1.
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B. Not All Prisoners Face the Same Dilemma-The
Dynamics of the Supply of Snitches54
1. The Defendants. Although every defendant who faces
the prospect of imprisonment is interested in mitigation,
not every defendant cooperates. This section explores some
of the factors that influence a defendant's decisions, in-
cluding the charge, the defendant's. preferences and his or
her lawyer's outlook.
Cooperation occurs most frequently in narcotics prose-
54. The prisoner's dilemma game theory model has become the most
familiar in the law. See WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1992). For
further explanation of this model, see generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW (1994), reviewed in Stephen W. Salant & Theodore S.
Sims, Game Theory and the Law: Ready for Primetime?, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1839
(1996), which has become a standard tool for teachers and students of
negotiation theory. See generally ROBERT M. BAsTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH,
INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING AND NEGOTIATION, 351-57 (1990); DONALD G.
GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 26-28 (1989). The
model posits two co-defendants facing identical charges. If neither cooperates
with the government, both will get a moderate sentence. If one cooperates and
the other does not, the cooperator gets a very lenient sentence while the other
defendant receives a harsh sentence. If both cooperate against the other, both
receive harsh sentences. See DONALD GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 26-28 (1989).
The prisoner's dilemma models a negotiation between parties with equal
power and equal access to information about everything but the other
negotiator's intentions. It teaches students that in many negotiations, defection
(usually deceiving or breaking commitments) can gain great benefits, but
carries the risk that the other side will behave similarly and both will suffer the
worst possible result.
Despite its name, the classic game theory/prisoner's model sheds less light
upon the actual choices of typical prisoners. In most cases the decision to
cooperate turns on the negotiation between the prisoner and the government
and is independent of the decision of other defendants. After all, the
government has very broad discretion to set the terms of the cooperation. There
are some cases involving two equally culpable defendants, both of whom have
no other useful information for the government besides the offer of testimony
against the co-defendant. If the government chooses to accept cooperation from
only one of them and the government could not otherwise convict the other
defendant of the most serious crime the two committed, the structure of the
prisoner's dilemma is presented, but even here reality diverges from the model.
The government does not provide perfect information about the strength of its
case or the sentences that will result from each course of action, and can change
the pay out as the game proceeds. See generally Richman, supra note 1, at 89-91
(explaining how the reality of cooperation diverges from the model). The
prisoner's dilemma much better models the risks and benefits of cooperation
and competition in two party negotiation than it models the actual problem
faced by most prisoners.
580 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
cutions, the single largest group of cases in federal court."
Narcotics trafficking cases, including both substantive and
conspiracy charges accounted for more than a third of all
sentences imposed in 1996.56 In about one-third (31.7%) of
narcotics trafficking cases defendants received sentence
mitigation for substantial assistance."1 Data suggests that
many others, perhaps more than 65% of those defendants,
provide information to the government, with only a portion
receiving the benefit of a cooperation motion.8 The typical
narcotics trafficking defendant has both a strong incentive
and good opportunity to snitch. The incentive stems from
the generally high probability of conviction, 9 made more
55. See 1996 FED. SENT. SRCBK., supra note 2, at 14 tbl.9. The link between
substantial assistance departures and narcotics offenses reflects both the
harshness of the Narcotics Guidelines. See, e.g., U.S.S.G., supra note 3, at
§ 2D1.1, and the mandatory minimums. Government motions pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 5K.1.1 for a sentence below the Guidelines range and government
motions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) for a sentence below the statutory
mandatory minimum are distinct. The government is free to make one or the
other or both, as it deems appropriate. See Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S.
120 (1996) (holding that the Guidelines did not create a unitary system-a
government motion to depart from the Guidelines does not confer authority
upon the court to ignore the mandatory minimum and a separate government
motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) is required).
56. The Commission's Distribution of Drug Guidelines Offenses chart reports
a total of 42,436 cases. Of these, 17,267 were sentenced under the various drug
Guidelines while 16,196 (38.2% of all cases) were sentenced under the narcotics
trafficking portion of the Guidelines pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2D1.1. An additional
1071 (2.5% of all cases) were sentenced under other drug offense Guidelines,
with about half that group (550 cases) involving misdemeanor prosecutions for
simple possession (including some crack possession cases that can carry a five
year mandatory sentence, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)) and the remainder involving the
following: § 2D1.2 Protected Locations 329 cases; § 2D1.5 Continuing Criminal
Enterprise 54 cases; § 2D1.8 Renting or Managing Drug Establishments 41
cases). Non-narcotics prosecutions accounted for 25,169 cases (59.3% of all
cases). See 1996 FED. SENT. SRCBK., supra note 2, at 45 fig.H.
57. Of the 40,818 cases for which the Commission had sufficient data to
analyze the departure rate by primary offense category, 15,882 were drug
trafficking cases and 5041 of them (31.7%) involved substantial assistance
departures in 1996. See 1996 FED. SENT. SRCBK., supra note 2, at 14 tbl.9.
58. The Sentencing Commission analyzed 264 defendants in 64 randomly
selected narcotics conspiracies prosecuted in 1992. More than 65% of those
defendants offered assistance. LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER,
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL
YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 26 exh.5
(1998) [hereinafter SENT. COMM. SUBST. ASS. STUDY].
59. Couriers may be arrested carrying significant quantities of narcotics.
Low and middle level dealers may have made several sales to undercover
agents or confidential informants wearing recording devices. Higher level
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onerous by the prevalence of mandatory minimums in
narcotics cases."0 Defendants in narcotics cases almost
always have information to offer. Typically, a number of
defendants are prosecuted together. Some may testify
against their co-defendants, while others may have infor-
mation about suppliers, customers or other drug dealers.
The benefits of cooperation are dramatic for narcotics
defendants, at least when their sentences are compared to
sentences of similarly charged defendants who do not
cooperate.6 The Commission's analysis of 1994 data reveals
an average sentence reduction of over five years for
narcotics trafficking defendants who gain cooperation de-
partures.2
Fraud cases are the next largest group of federally
prosecuted crimes but have a lower rate of cooperation
(15.8%)63 than narcotics trafficking cases because the
dealers and more sophisticated operations often face hundreds of hours of tapes
and months or years of surveillance. While capable defense attorneys can gain
acquittals in each type of case, the fact remains that 82% of the defendants who
went to trial in 1996 were convicted. See Defendants Disposed of in U.S. District
Courts, in BUREAU OF JUSTICE SRCBK., supra note 11, at 448 tbl.5.27.
60. Of the 17,165 cases sentenced under the narcotics Guidelines in 1996,
6365 (37.1%) involved a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years or more. In
addition, 4985 (28.9%) involved a five year mandatory minimum and 5842
(34%) involved a mandatory minimum of 12 months or less or no mandatory
minimum. Of the 4602 crack cases, 2643 (57.4%) involved a ten year mandatory
minimum or greater, while 501 (28.4%) of the 1766 heroin cases, 1919 (42.9%) of
the 4471 powder cocaine cases and 411 (9.4%) of the 4249 marijuana cases
involved ten year or greater mandatory minimums. 1996 FED. SENT. SRCBK.,
supra note 2, at 53 tbl.38.
61. Some defendants receive mitigation through charging decisions or other
downward departures. See infra pp. 57-65.
62. The mean decrease in the length of the sentences for the 4791 narcotics
trafficking defendants who received 5K1.1 departures in fiscal 1994 was 63.9
months. The mean sentence imposed on the cooperators was 51.6 months. See
SENT. COMM. SUBST. Ass. STUDY, supra note 58, at 32 exh.11. Comparison of
cooperation and non-cooperation sentences is impossible with this data because
the overall mean sentence reported for narcotics trafficking cases includes the
substantial assistance departures. The length of the departure correlates with
the length of the predeparture sentence. Id. at 17-18, 21. For defendants whose
guideline sentence would have been less than five years, the mean decrease was
13.7 months. For those with sentences between 60 and 120 months, the mean
decrease was 31 months and sentences over 120 months received a mean
decrease of 97.9 months. Id. at 32 exh.11.
63. Of the 5789 fraud defendants, 913 (15.8%) received substantial
assistance departures. See 1996 FED. SENT. SRCBY, supra note 2, at 14 tbl.9.
Some other federal crimes such as immigration and larceny offenses, show very
low rates of cooperation. Of the 4715 immigration cases, only 134 (2.8%)
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penalties are lower, their information is less valuable and
they often have other opportunities for mitigation. Fraud
cases encompass a much broader class of conduct than the
narcotics trafficking cases. Although some fraud defendants
receive very long sentences, as a group their ultimate
punishment is neither as severe nor as certain64 as the
narcotics defendants. The average sentence for fraud cases
in 1996 was 13.2 months, while the average sentence for
narcotics trafficking was 82.8 months. Lower average
sentences reduce the incentives to cooperate. A lesser
punishment simply provides less absolute motivation to
snitch. There is also less to be gained on a relative basis be-
cause the best predictor of the magnitude of the departure
is the length of the pre-departure sentence.6 The average
reduction in fraud sentences for substantial assistance was
only 5.2 months. 7
Defendants in fraud cases are also generally less likely
to have information to offer the government. Unlike drug
dealers, their crimes are more often individual or confined
to a small circle of people, and they are not inevitably
immersed in a world of criminality as a result of their
wrongdoing. Fraud cases also include "white collar" cases,
which typically involve the different dynamic of aggressive,
pre-indictment representation which more often results in
involved substantial assistance. Of the 2311 larceny cases, only 141 (6.1%)
received substantial assistance departures. Id. Some crimes simply do not lend
themselves to snitching. The typical federal immigration offense involves a lone
defendant or a group of equally culpable people whose conviction is straight-
forward.
64. The absence of mandatory minimum sentences for fraud defendants
opens the possibility of the full range of Guidelines arguments and ordinary
Guidelines departures. See supra note 41.
65. 1996 FED. SENT. SRCBK., supra note 2, at 22 tbl.13.
66. See SENT. COMM. SUBST. ASS. STUDY, supra note 58, at 18.
67. The mean decrease for fraud cases was 5.2 months. Id. at 32 exh.11. Of
course, some fraud cases do involve long prison sentences. See, e.g., United
States v. Hoffenberg, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2394, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1997)
(sentencing opinion imposing a twenty year term in a multi-million dollar
securities fraud case involving the failure of Towers Financial Corporation,
subject to a sentencing hearing). Other fraud defendants facing relatively little
jail time are very sensitive to the possibility of avoiding incarceration
completely and may cooperate even if facing relatively modest sentences. Twen-
ty percent of fraud defendants received probation only sentences, compared to
2.8% of the narcotics defendants. An additional 16.4% of the fraud defendants
received a combined probation and confinement sentence. 1996 FED. SENT.
SRCBK., supra note 2, at 21 tbl.12.
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non-prosecution agreements or individually tailored cooper-
ation agreements.
There are also disincentives to cooperation. Most
defendants share the general moral discomfort with snitch-
ing.69 For some, however, the taboo is especially strong.
Racketeering cases may involve the classic organized crime
defendant, for whom cooperating carries so great a risk and
so much stigma that they choose long prison sentences
instead."0 Leaders of other large criminal organizations may
also feel both a greater commitment to criminality and a
special aversion to cooperation because they so fear the
consequences of co-conspirator disloyalty.7' The increase in
snitching, however, strongly suggests that the current sen-
tencing structure has reduced whatever honor there may
have been among thieves.
Another common disincentive is fear of physical retal-
iation against the cooperator or his or her family.72 The
government has a very strong interest in addressing threats
68. See generally KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A
PORTRAIT OF ATrORNEYS AT WORK (1985) (describing the results of an in-depth
study of some members of the white collar defense bar in New York).
69. The general moral discomfort with cooperation is discussed infra nn. 75-
80. It is commonly assumed that other prisoners see snitches in a very bad
light. An illustration of this attitude can be found in the words of an inmate
discussing the worst aspects of prison in a fascinating inside look at day-to-day
life in prison from both the inmates' and penological perspectives. Robert
Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of
Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1156 (1990) (presenting an in-
mate's discussion about the worst parts of prison including among them the
problem posed by officers who try to make snitches out of prisoners they see as
weak); see also Richman, supra note 1, at nn.35-38.
70. See Richman, supra note 1, at n.35 (discussing the oath of secrecy in
classic organized crime cases and the prosecution of John Gotti, which turned
largely on the testimony of his former confederate, Salvatore Gravano).
71. I have not considered the innocent defendant, who may see cooperation
as offering too good a deal to pass up. This is a special case of the innocence
problem in plea bargaining. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1946-66 (1992) (discussing the
problem of innocent defendants taking advantageous pleas and suggesting
reforms to improve plea bargaining); Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 1980-86
(1992) (arguing in response to Scott and Stuntz that the innocence problem is
more theoretical than real but other structural flaws mandate the elimination
of plea bargaining).
72. See Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REV. 669, 734
(1980) (explaining that fear of retaliation is the biggest disincentive to
cooperation). The Substantial Assistance Guideline recognizes threats of harm
as a specific factor judges should consider in evaluating cooperation. See
U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 5K1.1.(4).
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against cooperators.73 For an incarcerated cooperator this
can require separation from co-defendants and other secur-
ity measures that mark him or her as a cooperator within
the institution. Threats against family may require relo-
cation or other security measures, and ongoing threats
following release may caution cooperators. 4
Defendants bear other risks that may be less readily
apparent than threats to safety and reputation, such as the
possibility that they will receive no reward, or a harsher
sentence, despite their good faith effort to cooperate. The
government assigns these risks to defendants at the
intersection of two powerful legal concepts, prosecutorial
discretion and freedom of contract. Taken together the two
doctrines as interpreted by the case law permit prosecutors
to structure cooperation to almost completely control
whether and how they will pay for cooperation and to put as
much of the risk of dishonesty as possible on the snitch. The
defendant's risks decrease as the process moves from the
relatively unstructured first meeting to a formal agreement
which affords some protections. Even at the very end,
however, the defendant faces the risk that the sentencing
judge will deny the government's request for mitigation and
impose a harsh sentence. Defendants can do little to shift
risk back to the government because each supplier (defen-
dant) is a one shot player, who cannot engage in group
action and can only sell his or her commodity to a single
buyer, 5 who enjoys both the ordinary broad power a
superior negotiating position confers in our contract law
regime and the special powers that come with the duty to
enforce the law.
The government's power to simply refuse to pay for co-
operation is illustrated by Wade v. United States," in which
73. For some examples of retaliation, see MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, WITNESS
INTIMIDATION: THE LAW'S RESPONSE 3-8 (1985).
74. There are also defendants who fear economic reprisal.
75. A single buyer of a good which has multiple sellers is a monopsonist. See
Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L.
REV. 1471, 1472-74 (1993) (analyzing the government as the sole purchaser of
defendants' convictions and arguing that the only effective counterweight to the
power of that position is to redisperse sentencing power by returning sentencing
discretion to judges).
76. 504 U.S. 181 (1992). Judicial constraints are only one kind of limit on
prosecutorial discretion. See Standen, supra note 75, at n.7 (explaining that
there are many factors that affect prosecutorial discretion including the impact
of supervisors, the desire to win and other role related pressures).
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the Supreme Court held that a defendant has no remedy for
a prosecutor's refusal to move for a substantial assistance
departure, except in the case of a refusal based on uncon-
stitutional class based discrimination or irrationality.77 At
the time of his drug related arrest, Mr. Wade gave infor-
mation that led to the arrest of another drug dealer. He was
later indicted and pled guilty without a cooperation agree-
ment. At sentence, his counsel urged the court to impose a
sentence below the ten year mandatory minimum. The sen-
tencing judge refused, ruling that the court lacked au-
thority to depart in the absence of a government motion.
When counsel argued that the government's refusal vio-
lated Mr. Wade's rights, the court asked for a proffer of
what the defense would show at a hearing. Justice Souter
noted:
In response his counsel merely explained the extent of Wade's
assistance to the Government. This, of course, was not enough, for
although a showing of assistance is a necessary condition for relief,
it is not a sufficient one. The Government's decision not to move
may have been based not on a failure to acknowledge or appreciate
Wade's help, but simply from its rational assessment of the cost
78
and benefit that would flow from moving.
Although Wade involved a defendant who did not have
any agreement with the government, informal and even for-
mal agreements will often provide no protection against a
prosecutor's refusal to reward a cooperator who has
complied with his or her agreement.79
Unsuccessful efforts to cooperate can have consequen-
ces beyond the failure to receive a substantial assistance
departure. Defendants who negotiate with the government"
77. Wade, 504 U.S. at 181, is consistent with earlier cases such as Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), in requiring that defendants make a
substantial threshold showing before a court will order discovery or an
evidentiary hearing on a claim that the prosecutor's refusal to move for a
substantial assistance departure, in the absence of any agreement between the
parties, violated constitutional prohibitions on prosecutors acting out on in-
vidious motives or in ways not rationally related to any government end. See
also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991) (holding that including the
weight of the carrier medium in assessing penalties is not irrational).
78. 504 U.S. at 187 (citations omitted).
79. The cases are discussed below, see infra nn. 93-106.
80. The attempt to negotiate a cooperation deal usually begins with a
proffer, or debriefing session attended by the defendant, his or her lawyer, the
prosecutor and the investigating agents, in which the defendant describes his or
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but do not enter into formal cooperation agreements"' may
be unaffected by the failed attempt at cooperation. 2 They
may even gain some other benefit of prosecutorial discre-
tion, such as a favorable charging decision that could be as
valuable, or even more valuable than cooperation.8 There
are also several ways that unsuccessful efforts to cooperate
can result in worse outcomes for a defendant. He or she
may suffer the stigma of cooperation without the sentence
benefit, if word gets out that he or she tried to cooperate. If
the government believes the defendant has lied, he or she
her own conduct and outlines the kind of aid he or she can offer the gov-
ernment. They are generally conducted pursuant to agreements which give the
defendant limited use immunity. Often the government agrees not to use the
defendant's statements in its case in chief, should there be a trial, but reserves
the right to use the information to get other evidence and for cross examination,
as well as in prosecutions for peijury or false statements.
The Supreme Court captured the essence of the contemporary proffer
session more than 100 years ago in describing the dynamics of the early meet-
ings at which the value of a proposed cooperator's information is evaluated:
Of all others, the prosecutor is best qualified to determine that
question, as he alone is supposed to know what other evidence can be
adduced to prove the criminal charge. Applications of the kind are not
always to be granted, and in order to acquire the information necessary
to determine the question, the public prosecutor will grant the
accomplice an interview, with the understanding that any commun-
ications he may make to the prosecutor will be strictly confidential.
Interviews for the purpose mentioned are for mutual explanation, and
do not absolutely commit either party; but if the accomplice is
subsequently called and examined, he is equally entitled to a re-
commendation for executive clemency. Promise of pardon is never
given in such an interview, nor any inducement held out beyond what
the before-mentioned usage and practice of the courts allow.
Prosecutors in such a case should explain to the accomplice that he is
not obliged to incriminate himself, and inform him just what he may
reasonably expect in case he acts in good faith, and testifies fully and
fairly as to his own acts in the case, and those of his associates.
The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 603-04 (1878).
81. A formal cooperation agreement is a final, integrated agreement that
supercedes any proffer or other preliminary agreements and sets out the
charges to which the defendant will plead, his or her other obligations and
specifies the government's reciprocal obligations. Formal agreements are
discussed infra pp. 587-93.
82. At least as measured by their ultimate sentence, if they suffer no
collateral consequences from the attempt to cooperate. They have lost
something in giving information and getting nothing in return, but there is no
other buyer for the information so they cannot, and could not, have sold it
elsewhere.
83. Other discretionary mechanisms prosecutors use to mitigate sentences
are discussed below, see infra pp. 608-11.
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may be denied the benefit of acceptance of responsibility
and could face a sentence enhancement for obstruction of
justice. 4 The defendant may also reveal other crimes or
criminal conduct that could result in new charges or an
increased sentence.
85
Moving beyond the very first stages of negotiation ex-
emplified by Wade and entering into a preliminary agree-
ment with the government holds its own risks for defen-
dants. Although some can bargain for better terms in these
preliminary agreements, most cannot.86 Defendants often
give up significant rights and will be held to the strict letter
of the agreements." In United States v. Mezzanatto,8 the
Supreme Court enforced a preliminary proffer agreement in
which the defendant waived the evidentiary privilege
against the introduction of statements made in plea
discussions. 9 The Court noted that "absent some overriding
84. U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 3C1.1.
85. The degree of protection afforded statements made during cooperation is
determined by whatever agreements the parties make. Wade offers an example
of a proffer agreement providing limited use immunity but permitting the
government to use the defendant's statements to gather other evidence which
would then be admissible against him or her and to use the defendant's own
statements on cross examination, should a trial occur. Wade, 504 U.S. at 186-
87. The Guidelines provide limited protection for information revealed during
cooperation. U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 1B1.8 That Guideline only protects
information if the defendant enters into an agreement which prohibits use of
the information and then only offers limited protection.
86. Most defendants simply do not have valuable enough information to
bargain effectively with the prosecutor. Even those who do may calculate that
they are better off winning the prosecutor's favor and gaining the greatest
benefit rather than worrying about legal rights that will come into play if the
deal goes awry and they are forced to litigate against the party they had hoped
would become their supporter. One countervailing factor is that many districts
use a standard agreement which incorporates favorable terms that the few
relatively strong defendants managed to negotiate.
87. Although some have argued that the power imbalance inherent in plea
bargaining renders all plea agreements contractually deficient, see Scott &
Stuntz, supra note 71, at 1909 n.4 & 1912 n.11, a critique that would certainly
apply to substantial assistance motions, Scott & Stuntz convincingly argue that
the fundamental norms underlying contract law support the enforcement of
contracts between parties of vastly unequal bargaining power, including
defendants and prosecutors. Id. Less convincing is their argument that prob-
lems arising from strategic interactions of the parties is a relatively easily
remedied structural problem. See Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster,
supra note 10.
88. 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
89. See Fed .R. Evid. 410. Mr. Mezzanatto was arrested on federal narcotics
charges and made an initial proffer to the government. He signed an agreement
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procedural consideration that prevents enforcement of the
contract," courts have enforced agreements to waive eviden-
tiary rules." Defendants will be held to their agreements to
surrender important rights.
Defendants who progress to formal cooperation agree-
ments usually fare better, but these agreements are also
carefully drafted for the government's benefit. They are ty-
pically quite clear on the defendants obligations"' and un-
certain about his or her rewards.92 Perhaps the greatest and
granting him limited immunity and permitting the government to use any
statements he made that day to impeach him if he took the case to trial and
testified. During the session he minimized his role in the case and the meeting
ended after he was confronted with surveillance evidence that contradicted his
statements. At his trial Mr. Mezzanatto was confronted with damaging
admissions he had made at his meeting with the government that contradicted
his testimony on direct examination. 513 U.S. at 199.
90. 513 U.S. at 202 (quoting 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5039, at 207-08 (1977)).
91. Defendants bear the risk that any breach on their part will result in
termination of the agreement. Some cases provide clear justification for the
prosecutor's decision to walk away from the deal including the the following
cases: those involving escape from custody, United States v. Holmes, No. 96-
6080, 1998 WL 124053 (6th Cir. Mar. 30, 1998) (holding that defendant's escape
from prison violated agreement), the commission of other crimes, United States
v. Fernandez, 127 F.3d 277 (2d Cir. 1997) (declaring that cooperating witness
violated his agreement in four tape recorded conversations with former co-
defendant offering to fix case for $10,000 and rejecting argument that
government received benefit of cooperation through eventual plea by co-
defendant so cooperator should receive his benefit), the withholding of
information, United States v. Garcia-Velilia, 122 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997)
(explaining that defendant's refusal to disclose names of suppliers of cocaine
used by defendant while on pre-trial release was sufficient ground for breach
and court did not have to consider whether agreement implicitly required that
defendant not commit other crimes), the telling of lies, United States v.
Armstrong, 842 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that defendant's
information proved unreliable therefore the agreement was terminated), or the
refusal to testify, United States v. Hon, 17 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
defendant's refusal to testify violated agreement). Others involving apparently
less serious conduct illustrate the allocation of virtually all of this risk to the
defendant. See United States v. Brechner, 99 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996) (illustrating
how the court accepted government's decision to terminate agreement when
defendant denied a key fact and then admitted it after immediate consultation
with attorney).
92. Typically, the terms of the agreement obligate the defendant to do the
following: plead guilty to the most serious count against him or her, be
completely truthful, provide whatever assistance the government seeks, commit
no other crimes and waive legal protections offered by the rules of evidence,
statutes of limitations and any other additional doctrines added to this list by
the government. The government typically agrees that the particular U.S.
1999] REGULATING SNITCHES 589
most disturbing risk these agreements assign to the co-
operator is that his or her cooperation may be judged not
worth rewarding after he or she has performed. Some
agreements simply provide that the government may, in its
discretion, file a motion for a substantial assistance
departure.93 The government also can, and does, bargain
away its discretion and commit to making the motion if the
defendant complies with the agreement, 4 but prosecutors
may still claim that the defendant's assistance was not
"substantial" and thus, not in compliance with the deal.
It is difficult to generalize about how often the govern-
ment refuses to make a substantial assistance motion
because the cooperation is not deemed valuable enough,95
Attorney's Office entering into the agreement will not further prosecute the
defendant for the conduct he or she has revealed to the government and will
inform the sentencing judge of the defendant's assistance. See Richman, supra
note 1, at 99 (offering examples of agreements which make the defendant's
obligations clear and the expected reward vague).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 16555, at *1, *3
(4th Cir. July 7, 1997) (holding that cooperation agreement gave government
discretion to determine whether to make the motion); Shehee v. United States,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2886, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 1997) (explaining the
agreement was that the government "may" move for a downward departure).
94. However, the government's discretion can be relinquished and, in fact,
"once the government uses its § 5K1.1 discretion as a bargaining chip in the
plea negotiation process, that discretion is circumscribed by the terms of the
agreement." United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1075 (4th Cir.). See also
Nasman v. United States, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6389, at *1, *5-6 (6th Cir. Apr.
1, 1997) (remanding with instructions that the government must fulfill the
agreement and make a downward departure motion at the resentencing);
United States v. Courtois, 131 F.3d 937 (10th Cir. 1997) (government may
bargain away discretion); United States v. Hernandez, 17 F.3d 78 (5th Cir.
1994) (quoting United States v. Watson, 988 F.2d 544, at 552-53 (5th Cir. 1993),
for proposition that government can bargain away its discretion). The
government may also limit its discretion by accepting an explicit obligation to
exercise "good faith" in deciding whether or not to make the motion. See United
States v. Gonsalves, 121 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the agreement
included an express governmental obligation of good faith which was satisfied
in this case).
95. It is difficult to even speculate about how often this happens. One case
offers evidence that at least one judge thinks it a problem in the Southern
District of Texas. In a case reversed because the defendant was mistakenly told
at arraignment that the court had greater review power over the government's
decision than it came to believe it could exercise at sentence, the judge is quoted
in a footnote saying, "And this happens with some frequency, where there is lots
of talk of Section 5K_.11 at time of plea, and then that magically disappears at
time of sentencing." The judge goes on to suggest that the United States
Attorney's Office be clearer in setting out its expectations for cooperators.
United States v. Amaya, 111 F.3d 386, 388-89 n.4 (5th Cir. 1997).
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but there is a steady flow of litigation in which defendants
have challenged the government's evaluation of their assis-
tance. Courts have resolved these disputes in three differ-
ent ways. Some courts have simply held the parties to the
literal terms of their bargain and permitted the government
to exercise absolute discretion reviewable only for unconsti-
tutional motive under Wade. A Other courts have reviewed
the government's decision for rationality under Wade.97 A
third group has used contract law to impose an implied
duty of good faith upon the government." Even that last,
96. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1993)
(government's refusal to make a departure motion was held unreviewable
absent an unconstitutional motive where agreement "expressly provides that
the government retains absolute discretion to move for a downward departure").
Other courts-have held that absolute governmental discretion is the default
rule unless the agreement explicitly limits its decision making. See, e.g., United
States v. Deollos, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 160 (10th Cir. Jan. 7, 1998) (holding
that government retains unfettered discretion unless plea agreement includes
an express promise); United States v. Rockwell Intern. Corp. 124 F.3d 1194
(10th Cir. 1997) (hodling the same); United States v. Courtois, 131 F.3d 937
(10th Cir. 1997) (holding the same).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Copeland, 122 F.3d 1063 (4th Cir. 1997)
(stating that the refusal to make motion was found not rationally related to any
government purpose where district court had extensive opportunities to see
cooperator testify and had basis to find that her refusal to implicate one
individual was justified and credible); United States v. Pipes, 125 F.3d 638 (8th
Cir. 1997) (explaining that review is limited by Wade but includes rationality
test; case remanded for hearing, with dissent arguing that defendant did not
make substantial showing required for a hearing); Sullivan v. United States, 11
F.3d 573, 575 (6th Cir. 1993) (discussing that an agreement obligated the
government to make the motion if the defendant provided substantial
assistance and also explaining the government's reasons for determining the
assistance not substantially "rational and acceptable").
98. Those courts have limited Wade to cases in which there was no plea
agreement and hold the government to a general duty of good faith under
contract principles. The Second Circuit has ruled that although the prosecutor
is in the best position to evaluate the defendant's cooperation, "the prosecutor's
discretion is not unfettered. '[W]here the explicit terms of the cooperation
agreement leave the acceptance of the defendant's performance to the sole
discretion of the prosecutor, that discretion is limited by the requirement that it
be exercised in good faith.' " United States v. Resto, 74 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir.
1996) (quoting United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990)
(additional citations omitted)). See also United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483
(2d Cir. 1992) (remanding case for further findings where trial court's finding
that governments refusal to move for substantial assistance downward
departure was made in good faith was not supported by record which showed
defendant performed by testifying at a trial and government's reasons for
denying motion included four factors that were known at the time the
agreement was signed; the government's reasons also included allegation that
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most stringent review of a prosecutor's decision not to
reward a defendant who has performed his or her
obligations under a cooperation agreement transfers little
risk to the government. Courts sometimes order hearings
and may even order the government to make the motion if a
breach is found,99 but the overall trend is to leave even the
cooperator who complies fully with his or her agreement
subject to the government's evaluation of his or her
cooperation.
Defendants also bear the risk that the government will
move for a substantial assistance downward departure, but
will provide a lukewarm evaluation of the cooperation.
Although defendants in egregious cases may get relief, °°
typical cases involve a judicially acceptable lack of prosecu-
torial enthusiasm or the inclusion of unhelpful facts in the
government's recitation of the cooperator's assistance.'0 '
Another risk is that the judge will give either little or
trial testimony was inconsistent with others but there was no allegation on the
record that the testimony was untruthful); United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477
(3d Cir. 1998) (applying contract principles to permit court review of whether
government acted in good faith in evaluating defendant's cooperation pursuant
to an agreement). The Eleventh Circuit has criticized this approach as too
invasive of prosecutorial discretion. See United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492,
1501-03 (11th Cir. 1993).
99. See Pipes, 125 F.3d at 638 (holding that a hearing is required to
determine rationality of decision based on hearsay allegations of cooperator's
lack of reliability); United States v. Rounsavall, 128 F.3d 665 (8th Cir. 1997)
(remanding case for hearing to determine if the government's refusal to make
the motion stemmed irrationally from the defendant's brother's refusal to
cooperate); United States v. Leonard, 50 F.3d 1152, 1154 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating
that hearing required to develop record to permit district judge to evaluate
government's claim that cooperator changed his story); Knights, 968 F.2d at
1483 (remanding case for hearing); United States v. Ganz, 806 F. Supp. 1567
(S.D. Fl. 1992) (ordering government to make substantial assistance motion
after court reviewed and evaluated defendant's cooperation and government's
actions in refusing motion).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 1992)
(explaining that there was a breach of agreement to make a specific sentence
recommendation when prosecutor followed recommendation by urging the court
to "impose a lengthy period of incarceration" and to "send a strong message").
101. See United States v. Jimenez, 992 F.2d 131, 135 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding
no breach where prosecutor made the promised sentence recommendation but
questioned the validity of the defendant's assertion of threat of physical harm,
made for the first time at the sentencing hearing); United States v. Benchimol,
471 U.S. 453 (1985) (deciding that plea agreement does not bind the gov-
ernment to express any particular level of enthusiasm for the recommended
sentence and there is no breach of the agreement if the government leaves the
sentencing court with the impression that it is less than enthusiastic).
592 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
no reward to the cooperator. °2 The court's decision whether
and how much to mitigate the sentence is unreviewable on
appeal' ° and may turn on the court's own evaluation of the
cooperation,' the offense 1°5 or leniency already granted the
defendant in the plea agreement.' 6
Despite all the disincentives and risks, defendants flock
to proffer sessions. For many, the prospect of a long prison
sentence simply overwhelms every other consideration.
Even for those inclined to a cooler assessment of their
situation, the risk of receiving no or little reward through
the exercise of prosecutorial or judicial discretion may be of
little consequence. Given the bad outcome that they expect,
a small chance of mitigation is still a better alternative
102. The magnitude of the departure might be seen as an aspect of the price
paid for cooperation that is controlled by the judge, but his or her ability to
effect the market (influence defendants' decisions about cooperation) through
that pricing power is limited. Only the prosecutor can open the door to a
substantial assistance departure and the defendant often does not know the
identity of the judge when he or she has to decide whether or not to cooperate.
In addition, prosecutors exercise a fair degree of influence over the magnitude
of the departure. Most federal judges are understandably inclined to listen care-
fully to the prosecutor's characterization of the value of the cooperation and use
it to calibrate the magnitude of the departure.
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1997) (permitting appeals of sentences imposed
in violation of the law, resulting from incorrect application of the Guidelines
and outside the Guideline range, but not sentences within a lawful and
correctly determined Guideline range). See, e.g., United States v. Ramos-Rosa,
No. 96-1912, 1997 WL 312177, at *1 (1st Cir. June 9, 1997) (determining that
decision about whether and how much to depart from government's sentence
recommendation is unreviewable so long as court recognized and exercised its
discretion); United States v. Light, No. 96-5482, 1997 WL 720386, at *4 (6th
Cir. Nov. 10, 1997) (reasoning that judge's decision not to depart from
government's sentence recommendation, after government motion, is not
cognizable on appeal).
104. See United States v. Winters, 117 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 1997) (utilizing
judge's own evaluation of defendant in sentencing process); United States v.
Lucas, 17 F.3d 596 (2d Cir. 1994) (refusing a downward departure based on
judge's review of defendant); United States v. Foster, 988 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir.
1993); United States v. Dellinger, 986 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Mittlestadt, 969 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Dobynes, 905 F.2d
1192 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cloughley, 901 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1990).
105. See United States v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 1997) (determining
that sentencing court is not limited to the factors set out in § 5K1.1 and
properly considered seriousness of underlying offense in limiting substantial
assistance departure to three levels).
106. See United States v. Carnes, 945 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1991) (limiting
extent of departure by consideration of plea bargain benefit); United States v.
Sutherland, 890 F.2d 1042 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Taylor, 868 F.2d
125 (5th Cir. 1989).
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than no chance of mitigation. Finally, it bears noting that
many defendants are not particularly good at assessing risk
and exercising judgment. People with those strengths are
less likely to commit crimes-or at least arguably less likely
to get caught.
2. The Defense Lawyers. Another actor who influences
the decision to cooperate is the defense lawyer."7 Defen-
dants do not generally learn about or respond to their legal
predicament directly. They are represented by defense at-
torneys who have their own interests and motivations. This
is the problem of agency costs." 8 Lawyers play a par-
ticularly important role in their clients' decision-making
about cooperation because so much turns on predictions
about the relative benefits of the uncertain path of coop-
eration, compared to taking an ordinary plea or going to
trial.0 9
Lawyers have a variety of reasons for favoring or
disfavoring cooperation. Most fundamentally, they may
simply be ideologically opposed to cooperation, as are many
defendants."0 They also have practical concerns. Lawyers in
private practice may view representing a cooperator as a
threat to future business. or as a selling point to future
107. See Richman, supra note 1 (analyzing extensively and insightfully
lawyers' incentives and disincentives to cooperate).
108. See Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System,
supra note 9, at 50-59 (discussing agency costs for both prosecution and de-
fense); Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra note 10.
109. Although the hypothetical narcotics defendant discussed above, supra
note 44, who faces a long sentence and against whom the government has
strong evidence may seem to have a relatively straightforward decision that is
likely to lead to cooperation, much may depend on how the lawyer presents the
situation. For example, the lawyer may highlight the dangers and risks or the
benefits of cooperation. More subtly the chances of cooperation may be
maximized by presenting the mandatory minimum first and emphasizing the
dangers of trial. Conversely, the chance of cooperating may be minimized by a
counseling strategy that emphasizes the choice between trial and plea with a
passing mention of cooperation near the close, once a decision between those
options has begun to form. The lawyer will have relatively less influence on a
strong-willed client who perceives himself or herself as well informed but can
have great influence, and may exercise it consciously or unconsciously, on the
many defendants who are terrified by their situation and mystified by the
complexities of our legal system.
110. Richman, supra note 1, at 117.
111. One extreme example is a case involving a lawyer paid by someone
other than the defendant. This lawyer actively discouraged his client from co-
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clients, depending on their area of specialization within the
defense bar."2 Appointed counsel's strong incentive to re-
solve cases with plea bargains. will tend to encourage co-
operation deals. In the best light, cooperation permits zeal-
ous appointed defenders to help some of their provably
guilty clients get sentencing relief"4 and efficiently handle
large caseloads so they can focus their limited resources on
the relatively few winnable cases."' Those considerations
apply to institutional appointed defenders who have the
additional incentive of fostering positive long-term relation-
ships with their institutional adversaries by working to-
gether in cooperation cases.
B. The Demand For Cooperation-The Prosecutor's Robust
Appetite for Evidence
There is only one buyer for cooperation in each federal
district: the Office of the United States Attorney."6 Federal
operating by telling her she would receive no benefit from doing so. Further-
more, he advised her to falsely exculpate herself at the one proffer session
conducted at the client's insistence. See United States v. Gonzalez-Bello, 10 F.
Supp.2d 232, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
112. See Richman, supra note 1, at 121-22 (reasoning that a defendant
considering cooperation as an option might want a lawyer with some experience
in such matters while those defendants who believe their interests are best
served by insuring that no one among them cooperates will seek out lawyers
with strong reputations for never representing cooperators).
113. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 150 n.124 (1997) (presenting
collected studies showing that defendants represented by appointed counsel
plead at a higher rate than those represented by retained counsel).
114. There is a tension between the goal of minimizing punishment through
cooperation and the culture of institutional defense lawyers which Stuntz
characterizes as "valuing fighting the system and gaining victories, whole or
partial in any legal way possible." Id. at 155 n.132 (claiming public defenders
see themselves as fighting the system). This clash explains why one of the
nation's most highly regarded and aggressive public defender offices, Public
Defender Services of Washington, D.C., decided not to represent any
cooperators. See generally Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v.
Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEORGETOWN
L.J. 2419 (1996).
115. Bill Stuntz argues that institutional defenders are best understood as
triaging their cases, maintaining an aggressive adversarial stance in the
relatively few cases that appear winnable and taking a more conciliatory, case-
processing approach in others. Stuntz, supra note 113, at 159 n.145.
116. See Standen, supra note 75, at 1472 (stating that a prosecutor is a
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prosecutors have always wanted and used cooperation and
there is reason to think their strong interest in snitches has
only grown in recent years. There are three major reasons
for the strong demand for cooperation. First, it can be a
powerful law enforcement tool. Snitches may make it pos-
sible to prosecute significant crimes that might otherwise
go unpunished." They can also provide the only complete
narrative of a conspiracy whose details would otherwise
only be presented to a jury in incomplete snatches obtained
through wiretaps, undercover testimony and other investi-
gative tools that cannot match an insider's view."" But the
obvious law enforcement value is not the only thing about
snitching that makes it so attractive to prosecutors. It also
appeals to their desire to minimize the risk of acquittals
and control the outcome of their cases.
Every prosecutor wants to maximize his or her
conviction rate, or at least minimize acquittals, which, to
put it bluntly, they simply hate."9 There are several reasons
for their aversion to not guilty verdicts. The rate of trial
success drives the plea bargaining process. If defendants,
and their lawyers, believe they stand little chance of a trial
victory, they will be more inclined to plead guilty. Efficient
resolution of the large number of cases requires that trial
success rates be kept high.2 '
monopsonist or single buyer). For a brief history of the offices of the United
States Attorneys, their relationship to Washington and the selection of federal
prosecutors, see Griffin Bell & Daniel Meador, Appointing United States
Attorneys, 9 J.L. & POL. 247 (1993) (calling for merit selection of U.S. Attorneys
controlled by the Attorney General).
117. Michael Fortier's cooperation in the Oklahoma City bombing case and
Salvatore Gravano's testimony against convicted crime boss John Gotti are two
examples. See Jo Thomas, Swift, Hard Attack in Bombing Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 1997, at A3; Joseph P. Fried, Ex-Mob Underboss Given Lenient Term
for Helping as Witness, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at Al.
118. See generally Daniel Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and
Benefits of Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT. REP. 292, 293
(1996).
119. See Daniel Richman, Old Chief v. United States, 83 VA. L. REV. 939,
965-68 (1997) (discussing prosecutors' motivation and arguing that prosecutors
care less about winning than about not losing).
120. See id. at 142 n.99 (citing, inter alia, Sidney I. Lezak & Maureen
Leonard, The Prosecutor's Discretion: Out of the Closet, Not Out of Control, in
CARL F. PINKELE & WILLiAM C. LOUTHAN, DISCRETION, JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY:
A PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE 44, 46 (1985) ("Winning is important not only for
the ego satisfaction and enhancement of reputations that victory brings, but
also because a record of winning makes it easier to dispose of cases by favorable
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Trial success is also a key measure of a prosecutor's
performance, for both the prosecutor him or herself and for
supervisors. Many prosecutors, as well as defense lawyers,
see themselves as "trial lawyers." Their role satisfaction,
standing among their peers and effectiveness as negotiators
can all turn on their ability to believe and project their
belief that they will win any case they try. The importance
of convictions from both a docket control and personal
standpoint explains why conviction rates are also used by
supervisors as an important evaluative tool. Supervisors
recognize the importance of conviction rates and share the
role assumptions of their assistants and adversaries.12'
Federal prosecutors, in the final analysis, are simply
supposed to win their trials. They have the opportunity to
exercise their discretion to select the relatively few cases
they can prosecute from among the potential cases. They
have the power to dismiss problematic cases 2 and offer at-
tractive pleas to resolve meritorious cases that have proof
or other technical problems. Although there are some cases
that must be tried,"2 federal prosecutors can minimize their
need to try weak cases.124
The pressure to minimize acquittals leads prosecutors
to be very risk averse. Given those pressures and the heavy
burden of proof, most prosecutors are anxious to gather as
much evidence as possible. If the case is strong enough it
may induce a plea. If it must be tried, the prosecutor would
rather have too much evidence and find his or her proof
limited by the trial judge as cumulative than have too little
plea bargains in the future.")).
121. Id.
122. Indeed many more cases are dismissed than are tried in the federal
criminal justice system. See supra note 11.
123. Federal prosecutors must prosecute some classes of cases which can be
very difficult to win, such as criminal civil rights cases against police officers
and some prosecutions of political figures. Dismissal or very lenient pleas in
those cases, in order to minimize the risk of acquittal, would send a very
dangerous message to other potential defendants.
124. Perhaps this only seems like an insight to a defense lawyer who
represents indigent clients, but it was a revelation to me when a prosecutor first
told me that he was supposed to win and the defense was supposed to lose. In
addition, while I needed feel no shame in losing a case that had survived his
discretionary charging decision, he had the burden of only going forward with
cases he believed he could and should win. Although I wish the world were that




evidence and risk losing the case.
The line prosecutor's strong appetite for evidence is
only increased in narcotics conspiracy cases. Matched with
those defendants' strong incentives to cooperate is the pro-
secutor's particular evidentiary problem, which only a
snitch can solve. Even in the very strong case in which
there are tape recordings and a sale to an undercover agent,
only the snitch can provide the full narrative.125 Only the
flipped co-defendant can tell the jury the inside story and
head off the common defense effort to fill in the empty
spaces with doubts and exculpatory theories. How much
evidence does the prosecutor really need? No line assistant
really wants to find out what the minimum is because the
only way to really know is to lose some cases.
Cooperation also directly contributes to the goals of
minimizing the number of acquittals and moving the dock-
et. Cooperators plead guilty. They are never acquitted at
trial and add to the numbers of pleading defendants who,
taken together, form a persuasive argument to others that
they too should not contest their cases.
The third general reason that prosecutors are attracted
to cooperation is that it permits them to exercise discretion
to control sentences.2 Under the old law, judges and pro-
secutors exercised great discretion through different mech-
anisms. The Guidelines have greatly restricted judicial dis-
cretion127 and channeled prosecutorial discretion. Although
the relatively greater restrictions on judges have shifted
power to prosecutors, 8 the overall rigidity of the Guidelines
125. See generally Richman, supra note 119, at 292.
126. There are Department of Justice policies which should inform these
decisions. See David Robinson, Jr., The Decline and Potential Collapse of
Federal Guideline Sentencing, 74 WASI. U. L.Q. 881 (1996) (arguing that the
change in Department of Justice charging Guidelines from the more restrictive
Thornburgh Memorandum to the more lenient Reno Bluesheet introduced
another source of unwarranted disparity). Those directives appear to have little
impact beyond their occasional service as post hoc justifications. For a general,
if somewhat dated discussion of the problems with developing and enforcing
policies to control prosecutorial discretion, see Norman Abrams, Internal Policy:
Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1971).
127. See Weinstein, supra note 25 (manuscript at 19-25). The reduction in
judicial discretion eliminated an important outlet for prosecutorial discretion.
To the significant degree that prosecutors influenced judicial sentencing
decisions under the old law, they could use that influence to control case
outcomes. That option is no longer available.
128. See generally Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 14 (discussing the shift of power
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has lessened the ways in which that power can be exercised.
Substantial assistance departures have emerged as one of
the favorite ways to exercise prosecu-torial power. In some
districts, the desire to control (and often mitigate)129 harsh
sentences is the driving force behind extensive use of
cooperation.3 ° Cooperation is not, however, the only
mechanism for prosecutorial mitigation of harsh sentences.
Charge bargaining continues to be an important source of
sentence manipulation in some districts. 3' In other districts
prosecutors feel less need to mitigate sen-tences because
judges make greater use of their power to depart from the
Guidelines.' The desire to mitigate sen-tences is also not
universal. Some offices feel a stronger commitment to the
mandatory minimums and Guidelines and are simply less
inclined to mitigate sentences.'33 Thus, the opportunity
cooperation presents to manipulate sentences is a strong
incentive to their use in some, but not all districts.
Despite cooperation's role in maximizing convictions,
controlling dockets and its attractiveness to those pro-
from judges to prosecutors occasioned by the sentencing reforms of the 1980s);
Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's Ex-
panding Power Over Substantial Assistance Departures, supra note 14 (tracing
the expansion of prosecutorial power under the federal Sentencing Guidelines);
Standen, supra note 75, at 1472.
129. Substantial assistance does not always ultimately mitigate the
defendant's sentence. It may, for example, be a way for a prosecutor to structure
a plea to a very serious charge and give a relatively modest sentence break
instead of charge bargaining to a non-mandatory minimum or otherwise more
desirable charge.
130. See infra pp. 608-11.
131. See Schulhofer & Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, supra note 47, at 1292 (calling charge bargaining the most
important vehicle for Guideline evasion).
132. See Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569, 629
(1998) (comparing, in-depth, the districts of Massachusetts and Connecticut
detailing the interplay of actors and factors in shaping local practices and
noting that Connecticut prosecutors used substantial assistance departures less
than others because their judges departed more for given reasons than other
judges).
133. Perhaps in an ideal world we would want a prosecutor's only
motivation to be a commitment to the law and the public interest, although that
posits a world in which there is only one view on where that commitment would
take one. Whatever that world would look like, we live in a world in which that
motivation is filtered through the prosecutor's self-interest and general concern
about reputation. See Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory
System, supra note 9, at 62-63.
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secutors who wish to control outcomes there are limits to
prosecutors' interest in snitches. Perhaps chief among them
are the range of problems associated with relying upon
criminals whose testimony is motivated by self interest. The
ideal cooperating witness would offer complete and truthful
information about himself and others. He would be a
credible, convincing witness, a skillful and trustworthy un-
dercover operative and from the beginning of his or her
cooperation, generally law abiding and honest. Few cooper-
ating witnesses are ideal.
Prosecutors can have problems if the witness is not
honest, credible or constant. The three do not go together in
any predictable way and the worst cooperator may be one
who turns out to be dishonest but credible and changes his
or her account over time. Honesty is the most important
issue. Above all else, the government must be confident
that the cooperator who is assisting in the prosecution of
others is telling the truth.
A cooperating witness' credibility is a more complicated
matter. If the cooperator testifies before a jury, he or she
will come under a vigorous credibility attack, often using
the cooperation agreement as the central prop.' The gov-
ernment cannot afford to have the witness appear too moti-
vated to please the government, lest the defense be able to
persuade the jury that the testimony is a fabrication,
motivated by the desire for sentence mitigation. The coop-
erating witness must also be constant. The government
must be confident that he or she will say the same thing at
trial as he or she said in the preparation sessions.
As discussed above, cooperation agreements can be
structured to minimize these problems and allocate most of
the risks of dishonesty to the defendant. By making the
defendant's honesty a term of the agreement and keeping
the reward uncertain and contingent these problems can be
minimized, but not eliminated.' There will always be de-
134. See Albert J. Krieger, In Drug Defense, Stress Constitution Jurors Must
Recognize a Defense Counsel's Obligation to Uphold All Civil Rights, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 22, 1997, at C6 (convincing jurors that cooperators have a motive to lie);
SUBIN ET AL., supra note 24, § 18.9 (presenting an example of a cross exam-
ination of a cooperating witness by two different attorneys, one of whom must
pursue the theory that self-interest is motivating the snitch to lie).
135. Richman has written about how "making cooperation" is a "leap into
uncertainty." See Richman, supra note 1, at 94. For the defendant serves the
prosecution's interest in maintaining control over him or her between the entry
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fendants whose credibility problems are simply too great to
consider using them as snitches.
Even among those who are reasonably used as co-
operators, there are still risks that cannot be shifted from
the government. The use of cooperators always entails the
risk that their lies or other misconduct will create problems.
Convictions can be reversed,136 and in the worst case wrong-
ful convictions occur.
3 7
Finally, there are defendants whose crimes are so
serious that prosecutors would refuse to mitigate their sen-
tence under any circumstances. At some point the value of
climbing the criminal ladder and prosecuting ever more
serious criminals diminishes as the most serious wrong-
doers are prosecuted.
Prosecutors have strong incentives to seek assistance
from defendants who are inclined to offer their help. Al-
though they must weigh certain risks, the law permits them
to minimize those dangers by keeping the cooperator uncer-
tain about if and what benefit he or she may receive until
after the government has gotten the benefit of its bargain.
It is a rare prosecutor who will refuse to even sit down and
listen to what a potential snitch has to offer.
II. THE SYSTEMIC IMPACT OF WIDESPREAD COOPERATION
A. Substantial Assistance and Sentencing Disparity
The current sentencing regime has spawned a vigorous
debate over the relative merits of uniformity and indi-
vidualization in sentencing."' There may be agreement over
of the plea and the time of sentence.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991)
(reversing convictions growing out of the Wedtech scandal because of
cooperator's false testimony about his gambling habit); United States v. Griffin,
856 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (reversing convictions against the notorious
El Rukn gang because of outrageous government actions in offering benefits to
cooperators and not disclosing them to the defense).
137. See Stephen Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals
as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1383-86 (1996) (discussing the dangers of
perjury by cooperators and offering two examples of cooperator perjury that
resulted in wrongful convictions).
138. Much of the commentary has favored greater individualization. See
Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CmI. L. REV. 901 (1991) (analyzing the conflicting provisions
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the stated Guideline goal of avoiding "unwarranted dispar-
ity,'' 39 but the debate swirls around identifying disparity
and distinguishing its warranted from its unwarranted
cases.
140
Substantial assistance departures create sentencing dif-
ferences between those who receive them and those who are
charged with the same offense and do not benefit from
these departures. In some dimensions those differences are
unevenly and unreasonably distributed. For example, the
rates of substantial assistance departures vary widely from
district to district, as do policies regulating cooperation
practices and the consistency of the application of those
polices within districts. The sentencing impact of these
inconsistent practices on sentences actually imposed, how-
and arguing for more individualization); Kevin Cole, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Ten Years Later-The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1336, 1336 (1997) (arguing that the Commission's failure to make
fundamental theoretical choices makes the goal of reducing disparity
incoherent); Daniel Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992)
(analyzing the conflicting provisions and arguing for greater judicial power to
individualize); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process:
The Problem is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833 (1992)
(calling for more individualization within the Guidelines system); Stith &
Cabranes, supra note 39 (explaining that the Guidelines are excessively rigid).
The Guidelines also have their supporters. See Bowman, supra note 24 (arguing
that the Guidelines have struck the right balance and only judges whose power
has been curtailed dislike them); O'Sullivan, supra note 24 (noting that the
Guidelines system properly reflects differences in the underlying criminal
conduct). The strongest supporters of uniformity have been the courts of appeal.
See Reitz, supra note 39 (describing how the courts have taken a strongly
enforcement oriented approach to the Guidelines); Weinstein, supra note 25
(manuscript at 54-63) (stating that most circuit courts have favored uniformity
over individualization in their analyses of non-substantial assistance downward
departures).
139. Specifically, the Commission was directed to consider "the need to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) (6)
(1996 & Supp. 1998).
140. See Bowman, supra note 24, at 714-24 (stating that there is no
convincing case for increased disparity under the Guidelines); Gerald W. Heany,
The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
161 (1991) (arguing that disparity is just as great under the Guidelines);
Schulhofer & Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, supra note 47, at 1284 (stating that plea practices under the Guidelines
lead to some disparity but less than under the old law); Stith & Koh, supra note
26, at 287 (stating that sentencing disparity is as great under Guidelines as was
before).
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ever, resists generalization because substantial assistance
departures are only one factor in a complex and to some
degree self-regulating system.
For example, although cooperation departures consti-
tute the single largest group of downward departures from
the Guidelines, high cooperation rates do not correlate with
lower average sentences.' The sentencing impact of these
differential rates of substantial assistance departures ap-
pears to be counterbalanced by other exercises of prosecu-
torial discretion and judicial discretion. Because substantial
assistance is only one aspect of an interdependent web of
sentencing decisions, the impact of the differing uses of
substantial assistance on the sentences of individual de-
fendants is even more difficult to quantify. Prosecutors andjudges inclined to achieve a particular sentencing outcome
can get there in a variety of ways. There is evidence,
however, that substantial assistance mitigation is meted
out to those perceived as the most deserving, rather than
the most useful cooperators.
1. Variations in Substantial Assistance Departure
Rates and Policies. District wide rates of substantial assis-
tance departures vary greatly. There is an almost fivefold
difference in cooperation rates between the ten highest and
ten lowest cooperation districts. The average cooperation
rate for the ten districts with the lowest rates of cooperation
is 7.1%."' The average cooperation rate for the ten districts
with the highest rates of cooperation is 38.1%.' 4' The
roughly 10% of all defendants in the 10 lowest cooperation
districts had about one-fifth the chance of receiving a
substantial assistance downward departure at the time of
sentence... compared to the 10% of all defendants in the
141. There is no statistically significant correlation between a district's
substantial assistance rate and its overall average or median sentences or its
average or median narcotics trafficking sentences. These results are discussed
infra pp. 611-17, and in the Statistical Appendix, infra p. 633.
142. There are 4036 total sentences in those districts and 297 total
substantial assistance departures cases in those districts. See Statistical
Appendix infra tbl.1.
143. Actually, the Northern Mariana Islands have a cooperation rate of
85% for 14 cases. However, this is completely atypical so I have excluded that
district from my calculation. The districts I used are ranked 84 to 93. There are
3803 cases in those districts and 1485 total substantial assistance departures.
Statistical Appendix, infra tbl.1.
144. As is thematic throughout this section, local variations in practice and
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highest cooperation districts. 45 Although there are wide
variations between the top and bottom set of districts, there
are also 37 districts whose rates fell in a band above 15%
and below 25%.14
Another way to analyze the inter-district variations is
to compare some sets of neighboring jurisdictions. The
First Circuit, for example, is quite average with an overall
rate of 19.2%, but there is great variation among its dis-
tricts. New Hampshire had a departure rate of 43% (63 of
145 total cases), while its neighbor Maine, with the same
number of prosecutions, had a rate of 19.3%, (28 out of 145
cases).'48 Massachusetts departed for substantial assistance
other factors counsel caution in working with these numbers. The Commission's
statistics probably understate the real use of substantial assistance departures.
For example, the fifth lowest reported rate of cooperation is in the Eastern
District of Virginia, famous for the "rocket docket." Apparently most cooperation
in that district is rewarded with a sentence reduction pursuant to FED. R. CRnv.
P. 35(b), which permits the government to request a post-sentence reduction for
post-sentence cooperation. Although judges in that district will not postpone
sentences to permit cooperation to mature, they will ignore the requirement
that 35(b) reductions account only for post-sentence cooperation. See Daniel
Richman, The Challenges of Investigating §5K1.1 in Practice, 11 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 75 (1998). These statistics do not include such reductions. If
the Eastern District of Virginia is excluded as anomalous (although the practice
could be common) and the 11th district (the Western District of Arkansas) were
included, the rate is 7.5% (205 out of 3351 cases). Although there are likely
other examples of local practices which counsel caution in the use of these
numbers, the overall picture still reveals significant disparities.
145. The actual percentage is 9.3% of all sentences (3817 out of 40,879 total
sentences imposed). See Statistical Appendix, infra tbl.1.
146. Those that ranked 32 to 68 fell within this range. See Statistical
Appendix infra, tbl.1.
147. I have chosen pairs of neighboring districts as natural experiments,
with the underlying notion that contiguous districts might be more fairly
compared than others chosen to highlight disparity or uniformity. These com-
parisons are suggestive, although these districts could be compared in other
ways. For example, Connecticut and Massachusetts also share a border and
have similar rates. In the Guidelines scheme, however, any disparity is
troubling, while some consistency proves little.
148. In New Hampshire, 53.5% of narcotics trafficking defendants received
substantial assistance departures (46 out of 86) compared to 33.3% (21 out of
63) in Maine. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COM'N, 1996 FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS BY STATE tbl.9 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 SENT. STATS. BY STATE] (also
available at Sentencing Commission home page <http//www.ussc.gov/
judpackjp1996.htm> (on file with author and the Buffalo Law Review). The
mean sentence for drug trafficking in Maine was 61.2 months compared to a
mean of 47.9 months in New Hampshire. Id. at tbl.7. All district-specific data
on lengths of sentences and rates of departures for specific offenses are from
these files, which contain federal sentencing data by individual state and
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in 25.6% of cases (115 out of 450) and neighboring Rhode
Island departed in 4.6% of cases (5 out of 108).'" 9
Connecticut had a cooperation rate of 10.9%, with a rate of
19.2% for narcotics trafficking (15 out of 78 cases).
Neighboring Vermont had an overall substantial assistance
departure rate of 25.8% and a rate of 45.5% in narcotics
cases (15 out of 33 cases).5 '
Districts within states can also show significant
variation. The Northern District of Mississippi had an over-
all substantial assistance rate of 29.4% (45 out of 153
cases), with half the narcotics defendants receiving sub-
stantial assistance departures (30 out of 60 cases). The
Southern District of Mississippi had an overall rate of
16.3%. In this district, 36.6% of the narcotics defendants
received the departures (26 out of 71 cases), but those 26
narcotics trafficking substantial assistance departures were
almost 80% of all the departures (26 out of 33 cases).151 In
Illinois the three districts ranged from a low of 13.4% for
the Southern district to 18.8% for the Northern district to a
high of 32.7% for the Central District.1 2 Variations are also
district and offer more data than the district summary tables available in the
1996 FED. SENT. SRCBK., supra note 2. The national data is found in both
sources.
149. Massachusetts' overall rate of substantial assistance departures was
25.6%, with a rate of 37.5% in narcotics trafficking cases (63 out of 168 cases),
and an average imprisonment length for narcotics trafficking cases below the
averages. The mean sentence length was 64.2 months, compared with a
national mean of 86.7 months and the median was 44.5 months, compared with
the national median of 60 months. Rhode Island's substantial assistance rate of
4.6% includes a rate of 3.9% in narcotics trafficking cases (2 out of 51 cases) and
average imprisonment lengths closer to, but still below the national mean, at
76.5 months, with a median of 60, matching the national median. See 1996
SENT. STATS. BY STATE, supra note 148, tbls.7 & 9. A comparison of the
distribution of case types and other basic data suggests no obvious difference,
such as distribution of case types, between Rhode Island and its neighbor that
would explain the different rates.
150. Connecticut's drug sentences were quite long, with a mean of 104.8
months and a median of 87 months. Vermont's mean sentence in drug
trafficking cases (56.6 months) was below its median sentence, equal to the
national median of 60 months. See id. at tbl.7.
151. See id. at tbl.9.
152. The percentage of substantial assistance departures for narcotics
trafficking varied greatly throughout the three districts in Illinois. In the
Central District of Illinois Central, 51.8% (59 out of 114) of narcotics defendants
received departures. In the Northern District of Illinois, 36.8% (39 out of 106) of
narcotics defendants received departures, and in the Southern District of
Illinois, 6.8% (17 out of 250) of narcotics defendants received departures. See id.
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found out West.' In Washington the Eastern District had a
substantial assistance departure rate of 4.5% (9 out of 202
cases), while the Western District had a rate of 22% (97 out
of 440 cases).5
Circuit comparisons also reveal wide variation. The
Third Circuit had the highest overall substantial assistance
departure rate of 35.1%, with the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania mitigating 47.5% of its sentences on that basis.'55
At the other end of the spectrum are the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, with respective averages of 11.3% and 14%.156
As might be expected from the varying rates of substan-
tial assistance departures, policies governing cooperation
vary from district to district and are not consistently
applied within many districts. The 'anecdotal evidence
collected by commentators 5 7 is supported by a Sentencing
Commission study on substantial assistance which exam-
ined review processes within U.S. Attorneys' offices. Data
compiled through a mail survey, telephone survey and
review of randomly selected case files 55 indicates that less
than half the districts complied consistently with their own
The average sentences also varied throughout the districts. In the Central
District of Illinois, the mean sentence for narcotics trafficking was 98 months
compared with 119.7 months in the Northern District and 109.5 months in the
Southern District. Id.
153. Although the four California Districts were all low cooperation
districts, in the Central District 6.9% of defendants received departures
compared to 8.8% in the Eastern District, 12.2% in the Northern District and
9.5% in the Southern District. See 1996 FED. SENT. SRCBK., supra note 2, at 43
tbl.26.
154. Id.
155. The number of sentences mitigated are 388 out of 817 total. Although
67.3% of the narcotics trafficking defendants received substantial assistance
departures, the median drug sentence length matched the national mean of
60%, and the median was only 6 months shorter, 80.6 months compared to 86.7
months. The average percentage of defendants receiving substantial assistance
departures in the Middle District of Pennsylvania was 37.3%, compared to
20.2% in the Western District of Pennsylvania, 30.9% in New Jersey, 15% in
Delaware, and 14.3% in the Virgin Islands. See 1996 SENT. STATS. BY STATE,
supra note 148, at tbls.7& 9.
156. See 1996 FED. SENT. SRCBK., supra note 2, at 43 tbl.26.
157. See Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 14, at 124-28 (discussing
mechanisms and policies in several different districts); Saris, supra note 52, at
1045, 1048 (noting differing policies on whether or not to recommend specific
sentences and differing policies on when to make the motion).
158. See SENT. COMM. SUBST. Ass. STUDY, supra note 58, at 6-7 (describing
methodology).
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review policies, about one quarter complied in some cases
and one quarter consistently did not comply.'59 The Com-
mission's report also compared the kinds of activities
different prosecutors would consider for a substantial assis-
tance motion. There was wide agreement that testifying
against others, participating in the investigation and giving
information assisting in the prosecution of others, as well as
providing information about the wrongdoing of others,
would be considered in evaluating whether to make a 5K1.1
motion.6 ' In 8% of the districts, however, information about
others who were not prosecuted was deemed insufficient
and in one district only testimony under oath was deemed
adequate for consideration of substantial assistance mo-
tion.!" There was wide divergence on the question of
whether information about the defendant's own activities
would be considered. Almost half the responding districts
said it would be considered,'6 despite the plain language
requiring that the assistance be in the investigation or
prosecution of another person.'63
Thus far, the picture of significant variations in prac-
159. The lowest rate of complete consistency, 44.4%, was for the 36 districts
that reported that the U.S. Attorney, him or herself, reviewed the decision,
while the highest rate, 63.2%, was for districts that had review or approval by
an Assistant U.S. Attorney. The highest rate of inconsistency, 41.2% was in
districts that had a review committee. SENT. COMM. SUBST. ASS. STUDY, supra
note 58, at 8 exh.3.
160. Although not every district would consider each activity worthy of the
same reward. See Saris, supra note 52, at 1045-46.
161. Eighty-eight districts responded to the mail survey. All 88 noted that
they would consider testimony under oath; 87 would consider participation in
the investigation of another and information in the prosecution of others.
Eighty-one would consider information about the criminal activity of others and
43 would consider information about the defendant's own activities. SENT.
COMM. SUBST. Ass. STUDY, supra note 58, at exh.4.
162. Id. There is one potentially significant ambiguity in this section of the
report. Although it clearly notes that most prosecutors thought those who
testified should receive a motion, it goes to say some "used self-incriminating
information in considering substantial assistance." Id. at 9 exh.4. Although the
report treats both as answering the question of whether the one activity alone
was enough for a motion, if the question was posed as the report suggests, some
prosecutors may have been indicating that they would consider self-
incriminating information as one factor so that a defendant who gave
information about others and self-incriminatory information freely might do
better than one who only gave information about others. Id.
163. The explicit statutory and Guideline language specifies that the
assistance be in the "investigation or prosecution of another." 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e) (1994); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
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tices is quite clear. Different districts handle cooperators in
different ways. But it is difficult to draw clear conclusions
about the effects of those differences. The Commission
study also reports wide variations in whether a given
activity will result in a motion from the prosecutor for a
downward departure. This part of the report makes the
important claim that similarly situated cooperators can
receive very different benefits, but is not completely
convincing.
The section of the study relies upon analysis of data
from a random selection of narcotics conspiracy cases.' An
astonishing 67.5% of all the defendants provided some kind
of assistance to the government.'65 About half that group, or
38.6% of the total group, received the benefit of a sub-
stantial assistance motion.'66 The type of cooperation that
resulted in a motion varied. While all four of the defendants
who did undercover work for the government received a
motion, and eight of the ten defendants who testified or
provided tangible evidence received a motion, 67 sixty-two of
the eighty-six (68.8%) defendants who gave verbal infor-
mationlagreed to testify did not receive the motion.'68
Eleven of the sixteen who only agreed to testify did not
receive the motion and twenty-two of the forty-two who
gave verbal information only did not receive the motion.9
Although the data suggests that similarly situated de-
fendants received different treatment, the study properly
cautions that these broad categorizations of defendants may
lump together those who provided substantial and truthful
cooperation with those who did not. In particular, some of
the defendants who gave information and agreed to testify
164. See SENT. COMm. SUBST. ASS. STUDY, supra note 58, at 10 n.21
(describing this aspect of the study).
165. All § 5K1.1 recipients were assumed to have provided assistance but
only those non-section 5K1.1 recipients whose files had actual documentation of
assistance were counted as having attempted to cooperate. Those who provided
assistance not reflected in the case file and did not receive the motion were not
counted, making the 67.5% figure a conservative lower bound estimate. See
SENT. COMM. SuBST. Ass. STUDY, supra note 58, at exh.5 n.21.
166. Id.
167. See id. The data does not indicate whether the two who testified or
provided tangible evidence but did not receive the motion violated their





may simply not'have had substantial assistance to offer. 7 '
There are likely defendants who provide equally valuable
assistance but receive different benefits, but as the
Commission notes, that problem requires more study before
its precise dimensions are understood.
2. The Impact of Variations in Rates and Policies on
District-Wide Sentencing. By one measure, the impact of a
substantial assistance departure upon an individual defen-
dant's sentence is dramatic. The average difference between
cooperation and non-cooperation sentences in narcotics traf-
ficking cases is more than five years and as the sentences
grow, so do the reductions. 7' Obviously substantial assis-
tance departures reduce sentences. But all defendants who
do not receive substantial assistance departures do not end
up with harsher sentences than those who do. A defendant's
sentence can be mitigated in other ways. The prosecutor
may choose to offer a lenient plea bargain," manipulate the
sentence calculations through sentence factor bargaining73
or by omission of relevant conduct'74 or agree not to oppose a
defendant's motion for a non-substantial assistance down-
ward departure.
Each district reaches its own equilibrium in the use of
these devices, influenced by the attitudes and interaction of
the bench and U.S. Attorney's Office and the districts
170. Id. at 11. In addition, some defendants lose eligibility for § 5K1.1
motions by committing new offenses, lying or otherwise breaking their
agreement with the government.
171. See SENT. COMM. SUBST. Ass. STUDY, supra note 58, at Exh.11.
172. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 47, at 1292 (concluding that
charging and bargaining undercut the Guidelines).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Bello, 10 F. Supp.2d 232 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) (discussing sentence factor bargaining over Guideline level adjustments).
174. The Guidelines sentence is supposed to reflect all of a defendant's
"relevant conduct." See U.S.S.G., supra note 3, at §1B1.3 (listing, among other
things, instances of similar misconduct which may go beyond those charged and
conduct carried out by a co-defendant or co-conspirator if it was reasonably
foreseeable). If a defendant is charged with narcotics trafficking, the Guideline
sentence may be increased to reflect narcotics dealt by co-conspirators or
transactions other than those charged in the indictment. See generally Edwards
v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1475 (1998) (concluding that judge determines
whether conduct is part of same course of conduct); Paul M. Secunda, Cleaning
Up the Chicken Coop of Sentencing Uniformity: Guiding the Discretion of
Federal Prosecutors Through the Use of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1267, 1275 (1997) (discussing how relevant
conduct rules may be used by prosecutors to exercise discretion).
608 [Vol. 47
REGULATING SNITCHES
historical sentencing patterns."5 For example, districts tend
to mitigate sentences with either substantial assistance de-
partures or other downward departures, but not both.
Nationally there is a statistically significant negative
correlation' between rates of substantial assistance and
other downward departures. This pattern tends to mitigate
some of the sentencing disparity that would otherwise flow
from the wide variations in substantial assistance rates.
When judges are generous with mitigation, prosecutors
scale back and when prosecutors are free with substantial
assistance departures, judges make less use of their dis-
cretion to mitigate using other factors.'
There are still other ways districts can regulate
sentencing. The defendant who is not offered a cooperation
deal in a low cooperation district may enjoy the offsetting
benefit of a charge reduction or a judicial departure on
other grounds. Defendants who receive departures in high
cooperation districts may find the benefit lower than
average if the government chooses to tie its generous
departure policy with specific and modest requests for the
magnitude of the departure' 8 or judges limit the departures
on their own.' 9 These mechanisms can blunt the sentencing
impact of variations in local practices upon individual de-
175. See Michael Gelacek et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299,
361 (1996) (finding that those districts that were relatively lenient before the
Guidelines remain relatively lenient).
176. There is a statistically significant negative correlation (r = -0.27
(p<0.01)) between substantial assistance and other downward departures. See
Statistical Appendix, infra tbl.2.
177. See Farabee, supra note 132, at 596 (supporting the interpretation of
the nationwide pattern by a case study which compares Connecticut, a low
substantial assistance but high other departure district, with Massachusetts, a
low other departure but high substantial assistance district; Massachusetts
typifies the first and Connecticut the second).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 114 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1997)
(detailing a fact pattern where government recommended three level downward
departure for cooperation and judge only departed one level); United States v.
Jimenez, 992 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.' 1993) (specifying an agreement that the
government would recommend a 25% departure). See generally Saris, supra
note 52, at 1046-49 (determining magnitude of departure by variations in
prosecutorial and judicial practices).
179. Although it is only one anecdote, the judicial attitude is captured in
United States v. Garcia, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 30633 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming
as within his discretion the district judge's refusal to depart because so many
cases involve § 5K1.1 motions; therefore the instant case was not unusual).
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fendants within a given district.
Analysis of district-wide sentencing patterns shows that
sentencing practices within a district tend to even out
overall sentences within that district as compared to other
districts. The most important finding in evaluating coop-
eration is that despite the significant variations in sub-
stantial assistance rates, there is no statistically significant
correlation between those rates and the average overall
lengths of sentences of imprisonment or the average lengths
of narcotics trafficking sentences in a given district." In
other words, one cannot generally say that high cooperation
districts are, as a group, more or less lenient in their overall
sentencing than low cooperation districts. Districts in whichjudges tend to give more non-substantial assistance
departures do, however, tend to have lower overall sen-
tences and lower narcotics sentences.' 8'
There are several possible explanations for the fact that
overall sentence lengths do not correlate with substantial
assistance departures but do correlate with the rate of other
downward departures. The rate of other downward depar-
tures may be the purest indicator of judicial sentencing at-
titudes. If they do not use that device very much, they may
be generally inclined to longer sentences, even in co-
operation cases.8 ' Another possibility is that prosecutors
who do not make very many substantial assistance motions
may even out sentences through the use of other dis-
cretionary devices, while judges have no other device for
mitigation. A third possibility is that high cooperation
districts achieve the same average sentence through a
distribution of very high and very low sentences, while low
cooperation districts have more sentences in the middle.'83
180. The only significant correlation was that both the mean and median for
fraud sentences increased as substantial assistance increased. Otherwise there
was no correlation. See Statistical Appendix, infra tbl.2. This and other district
wide sentencing numbers only compare district wide results and do not reveal
any information about the actual distribution of the individual sentences in the
district.
181. There is a statistically significant correlation between the rate of other
downward departures and the mean for all sentences (r= 0.34 (p<0.01)), the
median for all sentences (r=- 0.25 (p<0.05)), the mean for all narcotics trafficking
sentences and the median for all narcotics trafficking sentences (r= 0.33
(p<0.01)). See Statistical Appendix, infra tbl.2.
182. Although this runs counter to the intuition that "harsh" or law
enforcement oriented judges tend to reward cooperators highly.
183. This distribution would suggest that those against whom cooperators
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Given the wide variations on practices, there are likely
examples of each pattern and combinations of patterns.
3. The Distribution of Substantial Assistance Motions-
Who Gets the Benefit? This discussion of the sentencing
impact of differences in the use of substantial assistance
departures has focused on patterns that tend to even out
sentencing differences among groups of defendants. That
analysis should not obscure the dramatic impact the de-
cision to make or refuse to make a substantial assistance
motion can have upon a particular defendant's sentence.
For some the impact may be mitigated by other charging or
sentencing decisions, but for others, particularly defendants
in districts that rely upon substantial assistance as a
primary tool for mitigation, the impact can be tremendous.
Thus, the reasons the motion is made or not made also
deserve attention although prosecutors' motivations are
very difficult to uncover."'
The Sentencing Commission's study on substantial
assistance departures concludes that the decision to make
or refuse to make the motion does not reflect the actual
value of the cooperation in many cases. Rather, the study
concludes that the rate of substantial assistance motions
correlates with gender and race,'85 but not with the value of
the information, and it provides evidence that prosecutors
use substantial assistance to mitigate sentences for less
culpable defendants.
The study examined the much discussed "cooperation
paradox," which suggests that higher level defendants will
be better able to trade upon their supposedly more valuable
information to receive lower sentences through cooperation
than their less culpable, but less well informed under-
provide assistance receive longer sentences balancing out the mitigated
sentences of the snitches.
184. The Commission has recommended that prosecutors be required to file
a statement of reasons for their motions to permit better study of this area.
SENT. COMM. SUBST. Ass. STUDY, supra note 58, at 21.
185. Women, non-minority defendants, U.S. citizens, defendants with high
school educations and younger defendants all showed a higher statistically
significant probability of receiving the departure than their paired
counterparts. SENT. COMM. SUBST. Ass. STUDY, supra note 58, at 19 exh.9.
Except for age, all those factors also correlated with longer departures of from
9% for women to 2% for high school graduates. Age correlated negatively with
the magnitude of the departure. Id. at exh.12.
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lings' 5 The study first compared the level of the conspir-
ator to the kind of assistance he or she provided to the gov-
ernment. The study concluded that higher level conspir-
ators such as organizers, importers and middle level dealers
of drugs are no more likely to work undercover or otherwise
provide the highest quality kinds of assistance than street
level dealers or the lowest level of conspirators comprised of
couriers, renters/storers and users. If higher level
participants do get more or better mitigation through
cooperation, it does not appear to be because they are able
to offer undercover or other more valuable assistance at a
higher rate than others.'87
The study next tested the assumption that defendants
who are conspiracy leaders do better in the cooperation
marketplace because their superior access to information 88
enables them to achieve better results for the government
than their less well informed underlings. Through case file
reviews and interviews with prosecutors, the Commission
concluded that cooperation from high, middle and low level
defendants was about equally likely to result in guilty
pleas, new prosecutions, new convictions and other benefits
to the government.'8 9
Finally, the study looked at the correlation between the
defendant's role and the likelihood of receiving a downward
departure motion from the government. Using a six position
hierarchy, the study found that the lowest level participant,
the so called "passive participants" who acted as "renters or
storers of equipment" were around twice as likely to get
substantial assistance motions as the more culpable high
and middle level co-defendants.'
The Commission's data suggests that all defendants,
regardless of role, have an equal chance of providing
particular kinds of cooperation and gaining particular kinds
186. See Oliss, supra note 12, at 1858 (stating that lower level defendants
will end up with higher sentences than their more culpable and better informed
supervisors); Schulhofer, supra note 29, at 212 (same); but see Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: An Explanation for "Unfair"
Plea Bargains, 23 RAND J. ECON. 507 (1992) (arguing that overall deterrence is
maximized because increase in penalties for subordinates outweighs reduction
in other sentences); Richman, supra note 1, at 80 n.49 (discussing inverted
sentencing and citing two judicial expressions of concern).
187. See SENT. COMM. SUBST. Ass. STUDY, supra note 58, at 11 exh.6.
188. This assumption is theoretically problematic. See infra p. 61.
189. See SENT. COMM. SUBST. Ass. STUDY, supra note 58, at exh.7.
190. Id. at 13.
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of benefits for the government. Less culpable defendants
appear more likely to be rewarded by the government.
The study suggests that these patterns reveal that pro-
secutorial rewards for cooperation do not correlate to the
value of the cooperation to the government. Although the
results are suggestive and provocative, they need to be used
cautiously.
The assumed link between the role and the value of the
defendant's information is not all that clear. Defendants at
the highest levels of a conspiracy may actually have little
useful information for the government. They can insulate
themselves from much of the illegal activity and may only
have information about more culpable players outside the
country or otherwise so well insulated that their coop-
eration is of no practical value. Low level defendants, on the
other hand, are less able to insulate themselves from risky
activities and may acquire much valuable information in
the course of their many meetings, deliveries, sales or other
illegal activities. In many instances low level defendants
may be more valuable sources and present as more credible
witnesses than higher level defendants. Although the Com-
mission's study found a clever and suggestive surrogate for
the value of the cooperator's information in measuring his
or her role in the conspiracy, its conclusion that more study
of this question would be useful is well grounded. The exact
relationship between the value 9' of the cooperation and the
reward to the cooperator remains uncertain.
Holding the question of the actual value of the
cooperation aside, the conclusion that low level defendants
in this study were likely to do the same things as their high
level counterparts and get the same kinds of results for the
government but were much more likely to gain a benefit
from the prosecution for their cooperation is an important
one. Although low level defendants, as a group, possess
more valuable information than the 'cooperation paradox!
assumes, it appears very unlikely that their information is
so much more valuable as to explain their higher rates of
191. Valuing cooperation presents very difficult questions. What are the
relative merits of a cooperator whose testimony is sufficient to convict a mid-
level player and cooperator who provides intelligence, but little or no admissible
testimony against a high level criminal? Should we factor in the break to the
cooperator and determine that mitigation of low-level defendant's sentence to
convict a mid-level player results in greater overall value than mitigation of a
mid-level defendant's sentence to convict the same criminal?
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substantial assistance downward departures. The picture
that emerges from the data and the anecdotes (albeit a
surprisingly impressionistic one given the wealth of readily
available data on federal sentencing) is that in the current
overactive market in cooperation, prosecutors use coopera-
tion to achieve docket control and influence case outcomes
to achieve particular results in individual cases, as well as
to further law enforcement goals. The widespread variation
in rates, both nationally and between some pairs of
arguably comparable districts suggests that at least some of
the cooperation is either not achieving, or not motivated by
the scope of, its law enforcement impact. All prosecutors
want to make good cases. If extensive use of cooperation
were driven by its value as a law enforcement tool, we
might expect that rates would even out between
neighboring districts and nationally.
The tendency of cooperation rates to fit into a larger
pattern within each district that evens out the ultimate
sentencing impact of substantial assistance departures in
the district wide sentencing picture also suggests decisions
driven by forces other than law enforcement concerns. This
is particularly true given the strong negative correlation
between substantial assistance and other downward depar-
tures. Prosecutors in districts with judges who readily miti-
gate sentences for other reasons do not have different law
enforcement goals from their colleagues in other districts,
but they do have different sentencing concerns.
Do federal prosecutors need very high rates of coop-
eration to achieve their law enforcement goals? Federal
prosecutors enjoy a very high ratio of crimes to the time
they have to prosecute them.' Assuming they want to
optimize their crime fighting, they should choose strategies
that improve their efficiency, allowing them to prosecute
more cases, 193 or strategies that result in prosecuting better
cases'94 in the time they have available. It is not obvious
192. This "crime to time ratio" is of central importance in understanding
how prosecutors allocate resources. Stuntz, supra note 120, at 24 ("the effects of
the crime to time ratio ... almost certainly dwarf the effects of variations in
legal doctrine on both the number of charges filed and conviction rates").
193. This assumes that courts could handle more cases. Although
cooperating defendants may assist prosecutors to speed some cases, in many
districts crowded court dockets are more likely limiting factors on the number of
cases that are prosecuted and the speed with which they are handled.
194. A case might be better if it involves more serious violators, more
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that high rates of cooperation achieve either goal.9
The evidence suggests that prosecutors in the current
cooperation market are motivated by a combination of law
enforcement concerns and prosecutorial desires to indivi-
dualize sentences. In that market there are sentencing dif-
ferences among some individuals and differences in the way
particular sentences are achieved, even if the overall
sentences do not vary that greatly among districts. Are
those sentencing differences warranted or unwarranted dis-
parities?
Those who equate fairness with uniformity96 will no
serious violations, averts more harm or has a greater deterrent effect than
would the prosecution of the case to which it is compared.
195. First there are cooperators who give information about their own cases.
The revelation of cooperators might be assumed to persuade some co-defendants
to plead guilty. Although the rate of pleas has risen slightly, and some low
cooperation districts have relatively higher trial rates, that may be explained as
the result of defendants not being induced to plead guilty with cooperation
deals, rather than a lack of persuasive evidence to induce pleas in non-
cooperating defendants. Cooperation does have that effect in some cases, but
there is no obvious evidence that it has resulted in appreciably higher plea
rates, particularly comparing some high and low cooperation districts. In many
narcotics cases the evidence is already strong and defendants choose to go to
trial because the sentence is so high, even on a plea, that they have little
incentive to spare government resources.
Other cooperators have evidence about other individuals not yet arrested in
that same case or who have committed other crimes. Should those cases be
pursued without comparison against the vast pool of other unprosecuted cases?
Cooperation requires resources that are not being directed toward the pro-
secution of another case. The problem for federal prosecutors is not the de-
tection of crime, it is the selection of crime.
Finally cooperation might result in higher quality cases. Perhaps
cooperators are in the best position to give information on the next level up in
the organization, and so on. If this were generally true, the high district to
district variations would be more surprising, unless it turned out that districts
with low rates of departures are gaining most of the benefits without paying
much for cooperation by not making the motion in most cases. For a defendant
facing a very long sentence after either a regular plea or a trial, a small chance
at significant mitigation may be adequate inducement, especially if it is the
same small chance everyone else gets.
The question is whether widespread cooperation alone is better than other
techniques such as undercover work and confidential informants along with
more judicious use of cooperators.
196. The Sentencing Commission and some of the courts of appeal are
among the strongest proponents of uniformity through their strict adherence to
the Guidelines sentencing structure. See Reitz, supra note 39, at 1465-66
(explaining that many of the appellate courts have taken a high
enforcement/low creativity approach to the Guidelines); Stith & Cabranes,
supra note 39, at 1272-74 (criticizing the Commission's refusal to share
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doubt observe that prosecutorial dissatisfaction with being
forced to adhere to the mandatory minimums and the Sen-
tencing Guidelines are not legitimate grounds for mitigation
but merely a source of unwarranted disparity. That criti-
cism has more force in view of the fact that although sen-
tencing excesses tend to be counterbalanced in the big
picture, there remain individual examples of clearly un-
warranted disparity because of inconsistent applications of
policies and sentencing rules both within and between
districts.
Many of those who advocate that sentencing should be
individualized might respond that most of these departures
are warranted. "' After all, prosecutorial discretion has long
and legitimately been exercised to moderate the potentially
harsh and unjust operation of criminal statutes that over-
criminalize. Although there is a legitimate reading of the
Guidelines that stresses individualization,98 that argument
takes it too far. The mandatory minimums were intended to
treat this specific class of criminals uniformly and harshly.
It is hard to argue that the statute was not intended to
apply to some of these defendants, as we might argue in the
typical overcriminalization context. In addition, the
prosecutorial role in mitigation is traditionally exercised
through charging decisions, not quasi-misrepresentations to
the sentencing court.'99
interpretive authority); Weinstein, supra note 25 (manuscript at 19-31)
(distinguishing the uniformity and individualization approaches to the
Guidelines).
197. Among the staunchest advocates for individualized sentencing are the
Supreme Court as illustrated by its decision in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.
81, 116 (1996) and the Second Circuit. See Weinstein, supra note 25 (man-
uscript at 48-54) and other commentators, supra note 138 (offering examples of
the rhetoric of individualized sentencing).
198. This is exemplified by Koon, 518 U.S. at 116. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
199. At least one court has expressed that view. "The desire to dictate the
length of a defendant's sentence for reasons other than his or her substantial
assistance is not a permissible basis for exercising the government's power
under § 3553(e)." United States v. Stockdall, 45 F.3d 1257, 1261 (8th Cir. 1995).
However, another judge, in the role of commentator, urged that cooperation
departures be used to avoid "ultra-uniformity" early in the development of
Guideline sentencing. Bruce M. Selya & John C. Massaro, The Illustrative Role
of Substantial Assistance Departures in Combating Ultra-Uniformity, 35 B.C. L.
REV. 799 (1994) (discussing areas of flexibility in the developing substantial
assistance area). Another court has argued that sentence factor bargaining, by
contrast, is properly viewed in the tradition of charging decisions as legitimate
[Vol. 47616
REGULATING SNITCHES
At bottom, widespread cooperation motivated by the
desire to control sentence outcomes must be recognized as
unwarranted disparity within the current regime, even by
those who favor its results. Although the disparities are not
nearly as troubling as they would be if the widely varying
rates of cooperation resulted in widely disparate overall
sentences, the overactive market in cooperation is a great
source of dishonesty and evasion and a still uncertain
amount of unwarranted disparities among individual defen-
dants.
B. The Threat to the Adversary System
Even were cooperation more evenly distributed and less
often used to evade mandatory minimums and Guidelines
sentencing, the damage to the adversary system from
having 20% of all defendants ally themselves with the pro-
secutor (and many more try) would still merit our attention.
Cooperation strips away what little remains of the
adversary system in the vast majority of criminal cases
resolved by a guilty plea. It further marginalizes and often
eliminates the defense lawyer. It places a premium upon
the development of a personal bond between the defendant
and the prosecutor and investigators which is antithetical
to adversary justice."'
Prototypical adversarial criminal justice, in which the
opposing lawyers battle over every disputable issue in a
case is a rationed commodity. Institutional defenders can
only afford to pursue that resource-demanding work in a
small percentage of their typically heavy caseload.20 ' In the
vast majority of cases that are resolved with a plea there is
exercises of prosecutorial discretion. See United States v. Gonzalez-Bello, 10 F.
Supp.2d 232, 237 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (calling the Guidelines" ambivalent on such
bargaining and arguing that it should be expressly permitted).
200. Gleeson, supra note 2, at 452-55 (explaining how prosecutors come to
feel compassion for cooperating witnesses and reward them more than their
agreements might require).
201. Stuntz argues that the notion that institutional defenders are just case-
processors has been largely rejected to account for evidence that the adversarial
role conception persists and controls the few cases that appear to merit the
investment in resources. Stuntz, supra note 113, at 41 n.145 (citing ROGER A.
HANSON ET AL., NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, INDIGENT DEFENDERS GET THE
JOB DONE AND DONE WELL 66-69 (1992); LISA J. McINTYRE, THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER: THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE SHADOws OF REPUTE 46-49, 148-50
(1987)).
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little that can fairly be called adversarial. Many have noted
that the prosecutor and defense lawyer are often united in
their pursuit of efficient docket control above all else. ' In
many dimensions defense lawyers, particularly institu-
tional defenders, have closer and more significant relation-
ships with prosecutors than with their clients and trade
upon those relationships to make deals, sometimes at the
expense of their clients. Negotiated pleas can even involve
collusion between the prosecution and defense. They may
minimize a defendant's conduct to fit within a prosecuting
office's policy, or agree not to disclose information to the
probation office or to the court.
But cooperation strips away what little is left of the
adversarial process in that vast majority of cases by simply
cutting the defense lawyer out of the process and putting
the prosecutor and the defendant on the same team. The
snitches' primary goal is not to enforce a legal right or even
gain a discretionary benefit from the neutral judicial officer,
but to win the favor of the person who has prosecuted him
or her. The vast field of discretion upon which cooperation
takes place makes it essential to win the prosecutor's favor.
The prosecutor must want to pursue the cooperation in the
early stages,"3 and as sentencing approaches mere grudging
202. Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor
in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 581, 582-83 (1986-87)
(studying the failure of appointed criminal defense lawyers to engage in
substantive motion practice and concluding they were primarily case-processors
interested in efficient disposition of cases). Regardless of whether Mirsky and
McConville are correct in generalizing their conclusions to all defenders and
cases, it seems likely that most institutional defenders have different goals (and
a different role conception informing their work) for the majority of cases they
triage as losers.
203. I once represented an older man charged with committing immigration
fraud by entering into several sham marriages with women who then used the
marriages to regularize their immigration status. It was an early Guidelines
case and although their enforcement was still fluid, my client faced the
possibility of a prison sentence of 12 to 18 months. He decided to try to
cooperate. Our first meeting began rather poorly, with the prosecutor seeming
uninterested in his information against the women involved and rather badly
disposed toward his acts of bigamy. After a time my client asked the prosecutor
if she would mind if he removed his false teeth, as they were causing him some
discomfort. She smiled and assured that he should make himself comfortable.
As my client removed his teeth, the prosecutor and I exchanged smiles and the
meeting took a friendlier turn. He entered into an agreement and received
probation. Although I will never know, I have always thought of that as the
turning point of the case-the moment my client became an old man whose
false teeth hurt, instead of, or in addition to being a criminal to that prosecutor.
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approval of the defendant's efforts will not win the extra-
ordinary benefits for which most defendants hope.
The mechanics of cooperation provide ample oppor-
tunity for the two to get to know each other. Indeed; coop-
eration has changed the expectations about how prose-
cutors and defendants should relate to each other. In coop-
eration the two talk directly after the defendant has been
charged with a crime. That is itself a significant departure
from a system in which once a lawyer is appointed, prose-
cutors only see the defendants they are prosecuting in
court, in the presence" of the judge. Every defendant who
wants to cooperate must sit with the prosecutor, waive his
fifth amendment right and reveal inculpatory informa-
tion."04 Before the modern era of cooperation, federal
prosecutors did not expect to talk with most of the people
they prosecuted, and their lawyers,"' in a setting in which
client and lawyer had made a calculated decision to try to
please the government.
Predicating the resolution of the case upon the develop-
ment of a personal relationship has repercussions for all the
players and the system. The role of the defense attorney is
turned inside out. He or she has an incentive to move away
from the client and become a cheerleader for the prosecu-
tion. Lawyers representing snitches can get good results by
distancing themselves from their clients over the course of
the representation in order to foster closer relationships
among the defendant, prosecutor and investigating
agents.2"6 At the same time the defense lawyer has an
incentive to strengthen his or her own relationship with the
Although it may not have been her conscious thought, perhaps it was then that
she decided to become his advocate for sentence mitigation.
204. This meeting occurs while the defendant usually has minimal legal
protection. See supra notes 80 & 85.
205. See United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 793-95 (2d Cir. 1996)
(discussing the role of defense counsel in opinion invoking supervisory power to
prevent cooperating witnesses' statements made without counsel in a
cooperation debriefing session from being used to negatively evaluate
cooperator's assistance); Gleeson, supra note 2, at 442 (criticizing the use of
supervisory power in United States v. Hammond, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988)
and offering an alternative view of the defense lawyer's role in cooperation
cases).
206. Gleeson, supra note 2, at 450-53 (discussing how defense attorneys may
limit their attendance at meetings to avoid the possibility of becoming witnesses




prosecutor. After all, the cooperator remains the uncertain
thrall of the prosecutor during the extended pendency of the
case. It is common for some tension to develop between
cooperator and prosecutor as time goes on,2 ° and a good
relationship between defense lawyer and prosecutor can go
a long way to smoothing over the inevitable conflicts. The
snitch's lawyer knows that the big payoff is not in the
enforceable aspects of the plea agreement but in the
unenforceable but all powerful discretionary choices the
prosecutor makes about what signals to send the sentencing
judge.
The tension many defense lawyers feel in representing
snitches has led some to argue that representing snitches is
simply incompatible with zealous representation.2 "8 Abso-
lute refusal to represent cooperators is impossible for most
institutional federal defenders and would deny many clients
their best opportunity for significant mitigation. When a
small part of the lawyer's overall caseload is cooperation,
the tension can be managed. Criminal lawyers are ac-
customed to making deals with prosecutors and although
cooperation is different in kind from the ordinary plea, the
defense lawyer, particularly the institutional defender, is
accustomed to these role tensions. The danger is that the
system has become one sided in some places. What happens
when everyone ends up on the same side? Many defense
attorneys fade from the picture as cooperation progresses,
attending fewer meetings and encouraging the development
of the relationships among prosecutor, agents and the
defendant that will ensure the most helpful exercise of the
prosecutor's discretion. The defense runs the obvious risk of
losing its will to fight, whether because everyone has
become so friendly or because it is not worth endangering
207. Prosecutors must explore the defendant's prior bad acts and other
sensitive areas to properly evaluate the cooperation, meet disclosure obligations
and prepare for cross examination. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84-86
(1963) (holding that government's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence
requires reversal); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (explaining that
the government's failure to disclose promise of leniency to cooperator is a
violation of the defendant's due process rights). These discussions are just one
source of tension in a relationship between two people who would typically be
very unlikely to choose each other's company if each had the choice.
208. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 114, at 2457 (discussing the decision of
the highly regarded District of Columbia Public Defender Service not to
represent any cooperators); Richman, supra note 1, at 116-17 (giving examples
of lawyer's ideological resistance to cooperation).
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the relationships that benefit most cases to fight for one or
two clients. That classic institutional defender pressure is
heightened by cooperation because it is so corrosive of the
standard role behavior.
Prosecutors face the danger of losing the distance that
encourages both fairness and a perception of fairness. It is
only natural for a prosecutor who has spent many hours
meeting with a cooperator and learned a great deal about
his or her life to develop some personal feeling for him or
her. °9 After all, the cooperator has helped the prosecutor
gain a professional success and the two have shared the
intense experience of a trial together. Without overstating
the case or suggesting that most prosecutors cannot main-
tain the opposing ideas of cooperator as criminal and
helpful witness there is still a personal element that
corrodes objectivity. As for the defense lawyer, this is a
matter of degree. What may be an acceptable cost in a few
cases to gain the benefit of important convictions can
become an unacceptable price when it is paid in many cases
for smaller benefits.
In addition to the damage to the roles of the defense
and prosecution, there is the danger inherent in lessening
the adversarial oversight on already powerful federal pro-
secutors. In cases involving litigated issues or even guilty
pleas involving substantive negotiation, all aspects of the
government's case are scrutinized by the defense, which has
an incentive to raise all investigative and legal errors. Once
the decision is made to try to gain a substantial assistance
departure, the government's errors are of no interest to the
defense. In fact the defense will often come to share the
prosecution's interest in hiding or minimizing problems
because the best result for the cooperator flow from the
prosecution getting its best result. When everyone finds
themselves on the same side, no one has an interest in
uncovering mistakes.
C. Government Endorsement of Morally Ambiguous
Behavior
Snitching is morally problematic. Although our distrust
of tattling runs quite deep, we also recognize that informing
209. Gleeson, supra note 2, at 454 (arguing that prosecutors have a
propensity to favor cooperators even if they may not deserve it).
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on others can be a duty 210 and even a virtue.21 On which
side does cooperation in federal cases fall? If our criminaljustice system is encouraging many defendants to violate
one social norm to mitigate the punishment for trans-
gressing another, that is a problem worthy of our concern.
First, there is the tattling problem. Whether it is the
"ethic of the schoolyard or the large family,"212 there is a
widely held aversion to reporting the misdeeds of others.
There are countervailing social norms, like the legal
obligation to report a crime or a lawyer's duty to inform the
authorities of the misdeeds of others, 2"3 but those ob-
ligations have inspired much lively debate1  and little com-
pliance.
One source of our reluctance to report others is the high
value we place on loyalty. It is one thing to call the police on
a stranger and quite another to inform on an associate or
family member.2 George Fletcher has argued that loyalty,
the recognition that some relationships are special and
entitled to greater deference than others, is central to our
concept of justice. Loyalty gives us an identification with
others from which our desire for a common good springs.
The desire for a common good leads to a sense of fairness
within the group which generalizes to the idea of justice.1
Loyalty, however, is not an abstraction for Fletcher, but
a product of our particular human constitution. In his view
loyalty is not a matter of choice, but circumstance. We are
constituted to feel loyalty to our particular community and
do not, as a matter of fact, identify ourselves with all of
210. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1998).
211. Richman, supra note 1, at 83 (discussing the glorification of McCarthy
era cooperators).
212. Id.
213. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmITY DR 1-103 (1983) (re-
quiring lawyers to report violations of the Code to the relevant authority);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 8.3 (1995) (same).
214. See generally Cynthia L. Gendry, Ethics-An Attorney's Duty to Report
the Professional Misconduct of Co-Workers, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 603, 606-15 (1994)
(arguing that deterrents to reporting the misconduct of lawyers in one's own
law firm are particularly strong); Gerard E. Lynch, The Lawyer as Informer,
1986 DUKE L.J. 491 (1986) (stating that the duty to report ignores the moral
status of informing and is unenforceably vague and over-inclusive).
215. The Unabomber case offers the contemporary hard case. Even in the
face of the ongoing murders of innocent people, many questioned the morality of
a brother turning in a brother.
216. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY 20-21 (1993).
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humanity, only smaller units. i7 We do not choose those to
whom we owe loyalty, rather our loyalties reflect the "duties
of the historical self.21" Although his argument runs more
toward duties of political loyalty to nation states, it cap-
tures the common feeling that our special duties to some
people do not flow from choice but rather from circum-
stance. We accord them special status in the expectation
that they will reciprocate and we will all benefit.
Even if Fletcher has captured something about why we
feel and strongly respect some obligations solely because of
our historical relationships, does that justify recognition
and respect for loyalty to comrades in crime? This question
explains why we initially feel disgust for snitching in the
criminal context but appears to offer analysis that could
free us from that feeling. We could react from our general
respect for loyalty but come to recognize that this is a kind
of loyalty that does not further legitimate interests and
should not be respected. There is a grain of truth to that
observation, but the argument throws the baby out with the
bath water.
We may feel aversion to the act of tattling, even when
the bad act deserves exposure, because we appreciate the
virtue of the loyalty itself, apart from the worthiness of its
object. The criminal does a wrong in committing a crime.
He does a separate wrong in his act of disloyalty to others
with whom he had a special relationship deserving of loy-
alty. We may fault the judgment that brought him into a
relationship of trust with wrongdoers, but his conduct in
that relationship is properly subject to separate evaluation.
The argument that the relationship that pursues illegal
ends deserves no loyalty fails to separate out the illegality
from the relationship. In fact we can respect the loyalty,
smartness or honesty of a wrongdoer even as we condemn
the wrongdoing.
Still, there is that nagging grain of truth that there is
something problematic about valuing loyalty in this
context. After all, if some acts of disloyalty can be excused
or even become heroic when motivated by a greater good,
shouldn't we think about the cooperator as performing a
good act, or at least making amends, when he or she ex-
217. Id. at 17-21. There has to be some other relationship against which the
special relationship can be measured.
218. Id. at 18.
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poses the wrongdoing of another? We can try, but that is a
very difficult story to tell about the federal criminal
cooperator who seeks a substantial assistance downward
departure. "19 After all, he or she is motivated by a desire for
a personal benefit, not some greater good.
In the end, the personal benefits conferred on coop-
erators may be sufficient explanation for the almost
universal disdain. Our strong mistrust for those who inform
on others for their own benefit has several strands. Perhaps
most important is that we have a hard time ascribing
selfless motives to the informer who gains a personal
benefit. We do not and should not believe he or she acts out
of good motives. Finally, we mistrust the informer who
seeks benefits because we fear the powerful motivation to
lie.220 The criminal defendant considering cooperation risks
scorn for those reasons and also appears an irresponsible
coward. The prospective cooperator is so afraid of the pun-
ishment he or she has brought on him or herself as to
choose to commit an act of disloyalty and bring suffering to
others.
The government should be more cautious than it is
about encouraging disloyalty.22 ' First we might wonder
about the moral lesson we teach individual cooperators.
Apparently two wrongs can gain an advantage, even if they
do not make a right. We should also question the impact of
very high levels of cooperation in some districts upon the
systemic values they model. When most defendants are
selling themselves and their punishment will be determined
219. The people most likely to tell that story are judges, United States v.
Ming He, 94 F.3d 782 (lauding the cooperator's contrition) and prosecutors,
Gleeson, supra note 2, at 453 (stating that most prosecutors have a far more
favorable view of accomplice witnesses stemming from a combination of valuing
their contrition and the prosecutor's own desire to "make cases").
220. More theoretically, if Fletcher is right about the roots of loyalty, then
seeking personal benefit is the most basic betrayal of the sense of common good
that flows from according some relationships special deference. If one must
disadvantage a member of the group at least one should forego weakening the
group further by increasing the inequity through advantaging oneself-if the
group is one whose cohesion we wish to encourage. Disloyalty that threatens
the efficacy of the criminal group is the very thing for which substantial
assistance departures provide an incentive. The question is whether, or perhaps
how much of that social utility strikes the right balance against our moral
ambivalence.
221. Fletcher's argument provides a strong basis for this concern by placing
loyalty at the core of our civic virtues.
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by how well they satisfy their former adversary, trust and
loyalty become scarce commodities. People become only
means to further other goals and cease being treated as
independent agents, responsible for their own actions.
The government has compelling reasons for rewarding
some cooperation despite our strong moral ambivalence
about it. From the prosecutor's point of view any moral
taint that may flow from encouraging others to engage in a
problematic act is counterbalanced by his or her selfless
and laudable desire to punish wrongdoing and benefit
society.222 But as cooperation increases in frequency the
justifications weaken. At the current levels of cooperation
the government is seriously undermining the fundamental
value of loyalty.223
III. SOLUTIONS
The solution to the problems that attend the excessive
use of cooperation is to decrease it by lowering supply,
demand or both. In the current system, cooperation is sim-
ply too attractive to all the players in the system, and they
generally gain these advantages at little or no personal
cost. Cooperation's significant costs in sentencing inequity,
damage to the adversarial system and governmental en-
222. This positive spin on the morality of the government's use of coop-
erators is not universally shared. Three judges in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and
ordered suppression of a cooperator's testimony because, the panel ruled, the
government committed criminal bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2), by
promising leniency in exchange for cooperation. See United States v. Singleton,
144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998). Labeling the government's routine conduct in
one-fifth of the federal criminal prosecutions criminal is a fundamental attack
on the morality of the practice. The panel's decision was vacated when the
Tenth Circuit granted en banc review on its own motion. See id. at 1361. The
Circuit affirmed the district court, rejecting the panel's opinion and holding that
the long history of rewarding cooperators with leniency, stretching back to
common law, puts this conduct outside of the reach of the bribery statute.
United States v. Singleton, No. 97-3178, 1999 WL6469, at *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 8,
1999) (en banc).
223. The modern example of a society overrun by government endorsed
snitching was the former East Germany. The extraordinary revelation of the
huge numbers of neighbors, colleagues and friends reporting on each other to a
massive security bureaucracy should give us pause. Although there is no
comparison between that experience and the current use of cooperators in




couragement of morally problematic behavior are almost
entirely externalized and offer no check upon the buyers
and sellers.
There are several different kinds of solutions to the
overuse of cooperation. One commonly recommended but
flawed approach is direct (non-incentive based) regulation
of prosecutorial discretion through guidelines, statutes or
other rule based restrictions on charge and sentencing
bargaining. Another approach is to lower the supply of
cooperators by reducing sentences, thus decreasing defen-
dants' incentives to become snitches. A third approach, the
most narrowly tailored and optimal one, would be to
decrease the demand for cooperation by limiting the
number of cooperators that each United States Attorney's
Office may reward, in effect imposing a price on what is
now a virtually free commodity.
A number of proposals have been made for direct
regulation of prosecutorial discretion in sentencing. Some
proposals suggest non-binding guidelines or review pro-
cedures to influence prosecutorial decisions in substantial
assistance cases and make them more consistent.24 Al-
though these tend to be low risk ideas, experience strongly
suggests that the incentives and pressures in the current
regime are too powerful to be much influenced by guidelines
and other voluntary mechanisms. Many U.S. Attorney's
Offices already ignore the Guidelines and review procedures
that they have.
Another approach would be legislative changes in the
scope or kind of discretion exercised in substantial assis-
tance cases. This approach could involve crafting a uniform
and judicially reviewable set of rights and obligations for
prosecutors and cooperating defendants, establishing a
mandatory schedule of sentence reductions tied to
particular kinds of cooperation to the Sentencing Guidelines
or changing the allocation of discretion between judge and
224. See Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal
Prosecutor's Expanding Power Over Substantial Assistance Departures, supra
note 14, at 245 (identifying nationwide prosecutorial Guidelines as the most
promising reform); Saris, supra note 52, at 1050 (suggesting that the
Department of Justice should develop and publish principled justifications for
prosecutorial discretion in substantial assistance cases); SENT. COMM. SUBST.
Ass. STUDY, supra note 58, at 22 (recommending that prosecutors be required to





There are two problems with efforts to create
enforceable limits on discretion. First, our experience with
the Guidelines illustrates the hazards of writing detailed
rules to govern formerly discretionary decisions.2 The more
we rigidify the system, the less able it is to account for
individual cases and the greater the pressure to manipulate
the rules. The answer to manipulation resulting from overly
detailed rules is not more detailed rules.
More fundamentally, enforceable standards governing
cooperation deals misapprehend the importance of
prosecutorial discretion in cooperation cases and in our
criminal justice system as a whole. Prosecutorial discretion
is the key structural device for allocating the scarce
resource of criminal prosecution, not just a policy judgment
about the relative merits of assigning power to different
players.227 We should be very cautious about additional
rules designed to directly regulate these complex decisions,
especially in the cooperation arena. Plea agreements play a
role in allocating criminal justice resources, and cooperation
deals often involve particularly potent resource allocation
choices. Decisions about cooperation deals effect the al-
location of resources in both the cooperator's case and in
whatever other cases are resolved, pursued or dropped
because of the snitch. Decisions about whether and how to
resolve a group of cases, and all the resource allocation and
fairness questions that go into such decisions, are
particularly ill-suited to general proscriptions. They are
choices that require contexualized decision-making using
the prosecutor's expertise.
Prosecutorial discretion is also crucial to achieving
some individualization of justice in our system. The legis-
lature must draft broad criminal statutes to protect society
against unforeseen or unpredictable harm (the problem of
225. See Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 14, at 177 (asserting that judges, not
prosecutors, should have the ultimate authority to determine who does and does
not receive a substantial assistance departure); SENT. COMM. SUBST. ASS.
STUDY, supra note 58, at 21 (suggesting that a choice be made between regu-
lating departure magnitude on an absolute or proportional basis).
226. See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 39, at 1281 (discussing the dangers of
rigidity and micro management).
227. See Stuntz, supra note 113, at 22-26 (asserting that prosecutors
determine how scarce enforcement resources are allocated).
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overcriminalization). Prosecutors choose among the large
pool of potential defendants who fall under those broad
statutes to maximize the benefit of limited law enforcement
resources and achieve individualized justice.28 Legislative
efforts to control the power to select what cases to prosecute
and how to charge them will either increase inequities or
manipulation, or more likely increase both.Assume efforts
are made to draft rules regarding what kind of plea offers
prosecutors may make to cooperators and what kind of
sentencing benefits they will receive. If the legislature
drafts with sufficient specificity to avoid overcriminal-
ization and decrease the risk of inequitable results, it will
create the kind of detailed, rigid rules that encourage
manipulation. Detailed rules invite finer and finer
distinctions to vent the inevitable pressure prosecutors feel
to fine tune results to individual cases. If the rules are
sufficiently well written to discourage manipulation, they
may simply encourage prosecutors to circumvent them by
choosing to prosecute other classes of cases. If, on the other
hand, the legislature drafts more broadly, prosecutors will
either be forced to accept inequities or engage in man-
ipulation to achieve the individual fairness at which
prosecutorial discretion aims.229 Prosecutors' decisions about
what cases to bring and how to charge and resolve those
cases turn upon a host of competing, interdependent
considerations. They involve choices that are quite hard to
regulate directly.23
A more effective answer to the problem of excessive
228. See Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 14, at 160 (asserting that prosecu-
torial discretion is an integral part of a system in which the legislature typically
over-criminalizes and over-punishes).
229. These considerations only apply to legislative efforts to control
charging decisions. Attempts to directly regulate the relationship between
cooperators and prosecutors face other problems, particularly the risk of
compromising the prosecutor's current ability to control cooperators by
deferring benefits and forcing them to accept most of the risks of their
misbehavior.
230. One commentator has convincingly argued that the best way to control
discretion is to disperse it rather than regulate it. Thus, the antidote for the
excessive concentration of power that has arguably resulted from the reduction
in judicial discretion at the same time as prosecutorial discretion has been
increased is to disperse sentencing power by restoring judicial sentencing
discretion. See Standen, supra note 75, at 1531-37 (calling for a return of
judicial sentencing discretion to disperse and so counterbalance the power now
concentrated in the prosecutor).
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cooperation would be to decrease the pressure that defen-
dants feel to cooperate. The most effective and most widely
advocated reform along these lines would be the elimination
of statutory mandatory minimum sentences. Commentators
and the Sentencing Commission have powerfully argued
that the mandatory minimums are inconsistent with and
undermine the Guideline structure. 3 ' Mandatory sentences
also put defendants beyond the reach of the mitigation
permitted within the Guidelines2 2 and the possibility of
other kinds of mitigation would decrease the incentive to
cooperate that defendants facing those sentences now feel.
The call to eliminate the mandatory minimums is one of
the few sentencing reform ideas that unites most
commentators and the Sentencing Commission. It may be
that the only people who are unconvinced are legislators
and the people who vote for them.3 Politicians would have
a very hard time defending themselves against attacks that
they are soft on crime should they suggest eliminating man-
datory minimum sentencing.3 4
If a politically acceptable way were found to reduce
defendants' incentives to cooperate, the supply of coop-
erators would decline. Fewer cooperators would lead to less
cooperation and therefore less disparity, less damage to the
adversary system and less cooperation about which to feel
moral ambivalence. A supply-side reduction in cooperation,
however, would not lead to the optimal reduction in
disparity. Defendants would not sort themselves by their
own law enforcement value. They would continue to be
motivated to cooperate by the length of their sentences,
regardless of their value to the government. Given that
231. See supra note 29 (discussing the conflicts between the Guidelines and
mandatory minimums).
232. Mitigation includes any non-substantial assistance downward
departures and downward adjustments under the Guidelines that would take
the sentence below the statutory punishment. Mandatory minimum sentences
are also criticized for shifting power to prosecutors by making sentencing
subject to charging decisions.
233. See Yellen, supra note 27, at 585-90 (explaining that political pressures
create harsher sentencing regimes). Even so, some who support harshness in
sentencing recognize the problems with mandatory minimums. See Hatch,
supra note 29, at 192-97 (recognizing problems with mandatory minimums but
concluding that the legislature's ultimate responsibility is to restore the voters'
confidence in the criminal justice system).
234. See generally Weich, supra note 33 (opposing mandatory minimum
sentences in Congress is politically unpopular but good policy).
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prosecutors have incentives to accept cooperators for pur-
poses other than law enforcement, we might expect a
smaller number of the same mix of cooperators, a sub-
optimal result.
The problem of excessive cooperation would best be
solved by encouraging prosecutors to better use their
discretion in the selection of cooperators. That could be
done by limiting the number of substantial assistance
departure motions each district is permitted to make to a
fixed percentage of the total number of sentences imposed
in that district. Although more careful statistical analysis
might be useful,235 this analysis suggests that districts
should be limited to making substantial assistance motions
in about 15% of the cases, a rate lower than the current
national average and a significant reduction for many
districts. Given that one-third of all districts have rates in
that range,236 that appears to be level of cooperation that is
unlikely to much restrict law enforcement and will probably
permit its use in almost all cases in which it has significant
law enforcement value.2 7
Imposing a limit on substantial assistance motions
would force prosecutors to evaluate each decision to use
cooperation against other possible instances of cooperation.
They would use their knowledge and judgment to make bet-
235. It would be useful to determine if there is any relationship between
rates of substantial assistance and any indicators of law enforcement efficiency
or success, such as convictions per prosecutor or crime rates. Although clear
relationships seem unlikely in such a complicated system, these relationships
should be explored.
236. There are 31 districts that report cooperation rates at 15% and below.
See Statistical Appendix, infra tb] 1.
237. Some will be concerned about limiting useful law enforcement oriented
cooperation. I have argued that differential rates in neighboring districts and
other evidence suggests that much of the cooperation is of marginal or no
benefit to achieving crime control goals. The unpersuaded may at least agree
that the differences in rates show that if there is a great deal of useful
cooperation in all districts, prosecutors have a variety of mechanisms for
encouraging its use. Cooperation involving information but not testimony raises
fewer issues about keeping defendants honest through uncertainty during an
extended period of time and some of that cooperation might be expected to be
rewarded with charge and sentence bargaining. Indeed, that kind of evasion is
to be expected, given the degree of evasion and manipulation that characterizes
the Guidelines. A strict limit on substantial assistance departures would not
equal a strict limit on snitching. Even so, limited evasion is not worrisome
because the goal is to encourage fewer, more carefully chosen instances of coop-
eration overall, not to strictly control or monitor each-choice.
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ter, more strategic choices about cooperation and maximize
its law enforcement benefits. To the extent some pro-
secutors continued to use cooperation for the purpose of
sentence manipulation, at least the overall incidence of
manipulation would decrease and it would be more likely to
be limited to egregious cases.
Limiting the supply of a particular prosecutorial tool is
an unusual proposal. We do not impose numerical limits on
prosecutors' supplies of any other investigative tools. Coop-
eration, however, is such a prosecutorial bargain in the
current regime and its effects are so problematic that we
should consider this limitation. Perhaps the idea might
seem less odd if we recognize that other investigative tools
whose overuse would be very problematic are better regu-
lated by the marketplace. For example, wiretapping and
physical surveillance are two very invasive law enforce-
ment tools to which there are relatively few legal barriers.238
The real restraints against the disastrous over-use of those
tools is that they are very time demanding. Wiretaps must
be monitored and surveillance requires constant human
attention. There are, however, no similar restraints on the
escalating use of cooperation.
An arbitrary limit on the number of cooperation
departures would surely have the same effect as other such
limits on discretion-it would cause other kinds of circum-
vention to increase. Federal sentencing is like a balloon.
The Guidelines are intended to keep it round, but there are
pockets of pressure that distort the shape. Every time we
push in one place, the balloon swells in another. We are
wisely unwilling to build a completely rigid structure, yet
there remains uncertainty about how to relieve the pres-
sure for individualization.
I have advocated a particular kind of increased rigidity
because the problems associated with sentence mitigation
through substantial assistance departures are greater than
the benefits. Substantial assistance should be limited to op-
238. Federal law permits the government to seek authority for wiretaps that
"may provide" evidence of a very wide array of crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1994 &
West Supp. 1998), and law enforcement officers "may see what may be seen
'from a public vantage point where [they have] a right to be.' " Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)
(holding that warrantless helicopter observation of marijuana plants not ob-
servable by ground observation from outside of home does not violate Fourth
Amendment)).
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timize its law enforcement role and minimize its use for
sentence manipulation. There remains the fundamental
problem of the widespread (but hardly universal) perception
that a significant group of defendants is punished too
harshly. The answers to that problem lie in reducing pen-
alties and fostering a return to reliance on the traditional
avenues for using prosecutorial discretion to achieve indi-
vidual justice. Prosecutors should rely on charge and plea
bargaining to achieve justice in particular cases instead of
turning every defendant into a snitch.
Statistical Appendix
This appendix contains two tables. Table 1 contains
univariate descriptive statistics and Table 2 offers bivariate
correlations for district-level sentencing data.'
Table 1, selected univariate descriptive statistics, in-
cludes two different sets of data. The columns indicating
total sentences imposed and rates of within Guideline and
downward departure sentences (columns 2-5) include all
the sentences imposed The descriptive statistics for the
mean and the median length of sentences where imprison-
ment was imposed (columns 6-9) only include those senten-
ces in which imprisonment was imposed.3
1. All data used in this statistical analysis is from 1996 FED. SENT.
SRCBK, supra note 2, tbls.13 & 26 and 1996 FED. SENT. STAT. tbl.9 (for each
district). Table 1 of this statistical appendix, which follows, is essentially a
reformatting of selected FY 1996 Sentencing Commission statistics. The
notation "n/a" indicates data that was unavailable at the time the statistical
analysis was performed but may have since become available. All numbers were
accurate as of July 1998
2. Rates of upward departure are not included in this table, but account
for 0.9% of all sentences. 1996 FED. SENT. SRCBK., supra note 2, tbl.26.
3. The absence of data on the lengths of individual sentences within the
district significantly limits what can be inferred about the distribution of in-
dividual sentences within a particular district. For example, the numerical dif-
ference between the mean and the median indicates the direction of skew for
the distribution of sentences within a district, but the magnitude of that skew-
ness cannot be determined from these two measures.
Statistical inferences about individuals (in this case individual sentences)
cannot be based on the examination of aggregate measures (i.e., a mean or
median for an entire district). See EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL
RESEARCH 92 (7th ed. 1995). There are two levels of analysis: individual sen-
tences within a district and the districts themselves. Making inferences about
the individual sentences within a district based on characteristics of the district
as a whole can lead to erroneous conclusions. Since there is tremendous varia-
tion in the magnitudes of individual sentences and in the total number of sen-
tences within each district, averaging the means (medians) across districts will
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Table 21 provides the Pearson product-moment correla-
tion coefficient 2 (r), or simply the correlation coefficient,
which measures the strength and the direction of the statis-
tical association between two variables. Correlation coeffi-
cients can vary from -1 to 1, with values close to -1 or 1
indicating strong correlation and values near 0 indicating
weak correlation. Positive coefficients indicate that high(low) values of one variable are associated with high (low)
values of the other variable, whereas negative coefficients
indicate that high (low) values of one variable are asso-
ciated with low (high) values of the other variable.
When correlation coefficients are calculated for two var-
iables, an observed significance level, or p-value (p), in-
dicates the probability of finding a false positive. It is most
common to use a p-value 0.05 or less as the criterion to
determine statistical significance, and p-values of 0.05-0.10
to indicate marginal significance. A p-value of 0.05 means
that there is a 5% chance of a false positive association,
p-values of 0.10 and 0.01 indicate a 10% and a 1%
respective chance of a false positive association.
The key for Table 2 appears on the page following the
table.
1. This statistical analysis was performed by Mr. Greg Drevenstedt, a
graduate student in demography and sociology at the University of
Pennsylvania.
2. The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient is calculated
using standardized scores for each variable, which are the deviations of each
observation from the mean divided by the variable's standard deviation. Divid-
ing by the standard deviation of each variable removes the unit of measure-
ment that each measurement is based on, hence the term scaleless. Using
standard deviation units makes it easier to quantify the statistical association
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